POP Coin has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 7 Jun 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 12 low (12 open, 3 acknowledged).
Initial Token Distribution
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
No Liquidity Supplying Mechanism
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Variable `_rOwned[account]` Not Updated in Functi
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Check-effect-interaction Pattern Violation
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Improper management of fee exclusions
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Inefficient Memory Parameter
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Emit Events
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Zero Address Validation
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Potential `Out-of-Gas` Issue
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Potential Removal of Reflection Mechanism
POP Coin - Audit · CertiK · 7 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| POP Coin - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 2 medium · 12 low 1 fixed · 3 acknowledged · 12 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Low | 12 | 0 | 0 |
In function `transferFrom()`, the `_transfer()` function is executed before checks and updates to the allowance are processed. ```solidity=230 function transferFrom( address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount ) public override returns (bool) { _transfer(sender, recipient, amount); uint256 currentAllowance = _allowances[sender][_msgSender()]; require(currentAllowance >= amount, "BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"); _approve(sender, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount); return true; } ``` This violates the check-effect-interaction pattern and should follow the checks and updates of the allowances. An added benefit is that having the allowance check `require(currentAllowance >= amount, "BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance")` before the execution of the `_transfer()` function (or any checks in general before such external function calls) will save gas since all remaining gas will be returned after the function reverts immediately due to insufficient gas.
Open the reportCurrently the `owner()` and `marketingWallet` are excluded from fees but there is no mechanism in place to handle these privileges when ownership is transferred or renounced. ```solidity constructor(address routerAddress) { IRouter _router = IRouter(routerAddress); address _pair = IFactory(_router.factory()).createPair(address(this), _router.WETH()); router = _router; pair = _pair; excludeFromReward(pair); excludeFromReward(deadWallet); _rOwned[owner()] = _rTotal; _isExcludedFromFee[address(this)] = true; _isExcludedFromFee[owner()] = true; // Issue: Owner account is excluded from fees _isExcludedFromFee[marketingWallet] = true; // Issue: Marketing wallet is excluded from fees _isExcludedFromFee[deadWallet] = true; emit Transfer(address(0), owner(), _tTotal); } ``` Proper changes to the exclusion of fees can still be managed when ownership is transferred, however an issue arises especially in the case of the renouncing of ownership. There is no way to remove the privilege of exclusion from fees for the previous owner if he/she does not remove the exclusion prior to renouncing of ownership.
Open the reportOne or more parameters with `memory` data location are never modified in their functions and those functions are never called internally within the contract. Thus, their data location can be changed to `calldata` to avoid the gas consumption copying from calldata to memory. ```solidity=530 function changeFee(Taxes memory _taxes) public onlyOwner { ``` `changeFee` has memory location parameters: `_taxes`.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralized roles.
Open the reportAddresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. --- ```solidity=536 marketingWallet = _marketWallet; ``` - `_marketWallet` is not zero-checked before being used.
Open the reportThere is a potential `out-of-gas` issue in function `includeInReward()` since it uses a loop to iterate over `_excluded`, which could potentially result in a high amount of gas consumption. If `_excluded` contains a large number of elements, the loop may consume more gas than is available in a single block. This would cause the transaction to fail with the "out-of-gas" error. ```solidity=303 for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) { if (_excluded[i] == account) { _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1]; _tOwned[account] = 0; _isExcluded[account] = false; _excluded.pop(); break; } } ```
Open the reportIn a reflection mechanism, users are charged a fee every time they make a trade. This fee is used to reward users who hold tokens, but it does not trigger a transfer of tokens. Instead, it only modifies a coefficient. In this mechanism, the user possesses two types of token amounts: `tAmount` and `rAmount`. `tAmount` represents the actual amount of tokens, while `rAmount` denotes the number of tokens after reflection. The rate between the two is calculated as $$$\frac{rTotal}{tTotal}$$$. The `balanceOf()` function returns the `tAmount` or `rAmount` depending on whether the address is participating in the reflection. ```solidity=216 function balanceOf(address account) public view override returns (uint256) { if (_isExcluded[account]) return _tOwned[account]; return tokenFromReflection(_rOwned[account]); } ``` The function `tokenFromReflection()` returns the token amount after the rate of reflection is taken into account. ```solidity=285 function tokenFromReflection(uint256 rAmount) public view returns (uint256) { require(rAmount <= _rTotal, "Amount must be less than total reflections"); uint256 currentRate = _getRate(); return rAmount / currentRate; } ``` In the `PopCoin` contract, the `rfi` fee is used for the reflection mechanism, which is utilized to decrease the `_rTotal` and subsequently reduce the `rate`. This results in the inflation of the holders' balances through the distribution of rewards. ```solidity=326 function _reflectRfi(uint256 rRfi, uint256 tRfi) private { _rTotal -= rRfi; totFeesPaid.rfi += tRfi; } ``` However, the `rfi` fee can be updated by the owner and set to any value less than 15%. If it is set to zero, then `_rTotal` will not be decreased anymore, and in this case, there will be no reflection mechanism. ```solidity=530 function changeFee(Taxes memory _taxes) public onlyOwner { require((_taxes.rfi + _taxes.marketing) <= 15, "Tax must lower than 15%"); taxes = _taxes; } ```
Open the reportA sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without set restrictions on the slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing a transaction before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (executing a transaction after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: * `router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens()` ```solidity=515 router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens( tokenAmount, 0, // accept any amount of ETH path, address(this), block.timestamp ); ```
Open the reportState variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas. ```solidity=139 uint256 private _tTotal = 210000000000000000 * 10**_decimals; ``` - `_tTotal` should be declared `constant`. --- ```solidity=144 address public deadWallet = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD; ``` - `deadWallet` should be declared `constant`.
Open the reportLiterals with many digits are difficult to read and review. ```solidity=139 uint256 private _tTotal = 210000000000000000 * 10**_decimals; ```
Open the reportThe contract cited has an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging, as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xebdb…d0a40xebdba914eb214fbf7ab1acd02563da43831ad0a4 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for POP Coin, dated 7 Jun 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“POP Coin - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for POP Coin.
15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 medium, 12 low (12 open, 3 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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