PulseBitcoin has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 18 Oct 2022; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open).
Centralization Related Risks
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Price Oracle
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Divide Before Multiply
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Function Should Be Declared External
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Incompatibility with Deflationary Tokens
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
The Edge Case of Mined Token
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Third Party Dependency
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Variables That Could Be Declared as Immutable
PulseBitcoin - Audit · CertiK · 18 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PulseBitcoin - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 2 high · 9 low 3 fixed · 8 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 6 | 0 | 3 |
In the contracts `ASIC.sol` and `ATM.sol`, the role `OWNER` has authority over the following functions: - `mint()`: Mint a certain amount of tokens to a specified account; - `burn()`: Burn a certain amount of tokens from a specified account; Any compromise to the `OWNER` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint/burn a great number of tokens without the consensus of community. In the contract `PulseBitcoin.sol`, `BA_ADDRESS` is serving as the only account to receive all the tokens from users when users call the `atmStart()` function: ```solidity=365 token.transferFrom(msg.sender, BA_ADDRESS, amount); ``` Any compromise to the `BA_ADDRESS` account may allow a hacker to transfer all the assets to the malicious accounts and cause considerable losses to the team and community. According to the `PulseBitcoin` project design logic, `OWNER` refers to the `PulseBitcoin` contract address since `ASIC.sol` and `ATM.sol` will be deployed by the contract `PulseBitcoin.sol`. The team must ensure that all the core contracts are correctly deployed.
Open the reportThe `atmStart()` function starts and determines the points of a new ATM instance based on the TWAP of Uniswap V3. However, there is only one price oracle adopted. Applying more price oracles, like Chainlink, can make this protocol resistant to price manipulation. The pair of `MAXI-USDC` is applied as one of the price pairs. ```solidity _uniswapPools[MAXI_ADDRESS] = address(0xF5595d56ccB6Cb87a463C558cAD04f49Faa61149); ``` Per the on-chain data of the [MAXI-USDC pair](https://info.uniswap.org/#/pools/0xf5595d56ccb6cb87a463c558cad04f49faa61149), its liquidity is terribly low at the time of writing, and it could be manipulated easily.
Open the reportPerforming integer division before multiplication truncates the low bits, losing the precision of calculation. ```solidity=190 pSatoshisMine = (((((pSatoshisMine - ((totalpSatoshisMined + pSatoshisMine) - currentHalvingThreshold)) * bitoshis) / pSatoshisMine) * miningRate) / DECIMAL_RESOLUTION) + (((bitoshis - (((pSatoshisMine - ((totalpSatoshisMined + pSatoshisMine) - currentHalvingThreshold)) * bitoshis) / pSatoshisMine)) * (miningRate / 2)) / DECIMAL_RESOLUTION); ``` --- ```solidity=196 bitoshisBurn = (((((pSatoshisMine - ((totalpSatoshisMined + pSatoshisMine) - currentHalvingThreshold)) * bitoshis) / pSatoshisMine) * miningFee) / DECIMAL_RESOLUTION) + (((bitoshis - (((pSatoshisMine - ((totalpSatoshisMined + pSatoshisMine) - currentHalvingThreshold)) * bitoshis) / pSatoshisMine)) * (miningFee / 2)) / DECIMAL_RESOLUTION); ``` --- ```solidity=356 atmPoints = (amount * (2**96)) / tokenPrice; ``` ```solidity=373 atmPoints = atmPoints * SCALE_FACTOR; ```
Open the reportThe functions which are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility for gas optimization. ```solidity=102 function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceId) public view virtual override returns (bool) { ``` ```solidity=75 function decimals() public view virtual override returns (uint8) { ``` ```solidity=153 function decimals() public view virtual override returns (uint8) { ```
Open the reportWhen transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f ```solidity=112 if (_plsd.transferFrom(msg.sender, DEAD_ADDRESS, amount)) { ``` - Transferring tokens by `amount`. ```solidity=113 totalPlsdTransformed += amount; ``` - The `amount` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees.
Open the reportThe function `calcPayoutAndFee()` calculates the payout and fees for a miner instance. The `if - else` branch only covers the case that the accumulated amount is greater than the `currentHalvingThreshold.` ```solidity=187 if (totalpSatoshisMined + pSatoshisMine > currentHalvingThreshold) { isHalving = true; ``` ```solidity=203 } else { ``` In the function `minerStart()`, `currentHalvingThreshold` will be updated if `isHalving` is true. ```solidity=231 if (isHalving) { uint256 newPreviousHalvingThresold = currentHalvingThreshold; currentHalvingThreshold = currentHalvingThreshold + ((currentHalvingThreshold - previousHalvingThresold) / 2); previousHalvingThresold = newPreviousHalvingThresold; miningRate = miningRate / 2; miningFee = miningFee / 2; ++numOfHalvings; ++atmMultiplier; } ``` However, there is a possibility that `totalpSatoshisMined + pSatoshisMine` is still greater than the updated `currentHalvingThreshold.` The function `minerStart()` will trigger multiple consecutive halving events and constantly halve `miningRate` and `miningFee.`
Open the reportThe contracts `PulseBitcoin.sol` and `ASIC.sol` are serving as the underlying entities to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=524 (int56[] memory tickCumulatives, ) = IUniswapV3Pool(uniswapV3Pool).observe(secondsAgos); ``` - The contract `PulseBitcoin.sol` interacts with a third party contract with `IUniswapV3Pool` interface via `uniswapV3Pool`. ```solidity=26 IPulseDogecoin private _plsd; ``` - The contract `ASIC.sol` interacts with third party contract with `IPulseDogecoin` interface via `_plsd`.
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage. ```solidity=37 ASIC private _asic; address public asic; ``` ```solidity=41 ATM private _atm; address public atm; ```
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for PulseBitcoin, dated 18 Oct 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“PulseBitcoin - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for PulseBitcoin.
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="pulsebitcoin"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us