As of 3 Nov 2026, Seed.Photo has 2 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Cyberscope, dated 23 Jan 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seed. | Security firm: Cyberscope | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | No open critical findings | Open · cyberscope.io |
| Seed - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 5 | 0 | 2 |
In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `renounceOwnership()`, maliciously give up the ownership. - `transferOwnership()`, maliciously transfer ownership to any account.  In the contract `SEED` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `freezeAccount()`, maliciously protect any valid address from transferring assets. - `thawedAccount()`, maliciously allow any invalid address to transfer assets. 
Open the reportThe change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.
Open the reportAccording to the code logic of `_beforeTokenTransfer()` function, we know that the frozen accounts just cannot transfer token, but they can still receive token from others. ```solidity=658 function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal virtual override(ERC20) { require(!frozenAccounts[from], "Frozen Account Can not Transfer Token,Please Contact the Support Team!"); super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount); } ```
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x6730…b7f70x6730f7a6bbb7b9c8e60843948f7feb4b6a17b7f7 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="seedphoto"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us