Sky security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, Sky has 150 audit reports by 3 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by ChainSecurity, dated 7 Sep 2026. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits150
Newest first
150 audit reports, 77 in Cantina’s series, 68 in ChainSecurity’s series
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sky LZ Init Lib | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky: LZ SSR Oracle Init | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky: Avalanche LZ Re-enabling | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky: Stars LZ Governance | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky: OFT Adapter v2 | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky xchain-helpers | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky OApp OFT | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky Governance Relay | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky: PAS configurator-unit | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky PAS Timelock Calldata Generator | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky: DSS Exec Lib | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky: SBE Beam | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky: PAU NFAT Facet | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky Diamond PAU v1. | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky: LZ DVN Broadcaster | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky: CCIP DVN Adapter | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky: LZ Gov DVN Deploy | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky CCIP DVN Adapter | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky LayerZero Governance DVN | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky LZ Governance Relay | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky: PAU Assemblers | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky DSS Exec Lib | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| PAU: Diamond PAU Deployment Scripts & Deployment R | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
| Sky Diamond PAU Deploy | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Sky: PAU Factory Update | Security firm: Cantina | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · cantina.xyz |
Findings204
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Medium | 2 | 5 | 17 |
| Low | 6 | 59 | 107 |
Medium`Dog` and `Clipper` could potentially have mismatched componentsAcknowledged
The `Dog` and `Clipper` contracts are designed to be components in a modular system that works together consistently to achieve certain functions. These contracts also interact with components other than `Dog` and `Clipper`, and it is expected that these components are the same from both `Dog` and `Clipper` perspectives. However, given that `vow` can set quite trivially via `file` in both contracts, without any validation, there is potential that `vow` may diverge and therefore lead to aberrant unexpected behaviors. At the same time, it was also mentioned in the code walk-through call that the `Clipper.dog` state variable which is currently `immutable` may lose that status in the future, and therefore even components like `vat` could potentially be mismatched and lead to larger issues.
MediumCure.cage() Might Block Shutdown ProcedureAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
MediumProxy does not support payable functions in its implementationAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
MediumRedemption Blocked When No Rate Entry at Maturity ExistsAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
MediumStakingContract.setRewardsDuration can be DoS'dAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowConfigure DVNs, peers, and pinned LayerZero librariesSky: Stars LZ Governance · Cantina · 4 Sep 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowIssue Accounting and Rate Limit Are Not Bound to the Facility GemSky Diamond PAU v1. · ChainSecurity · 6 Jul 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowNFAT position state can desync when repayments bypass facetSky: PAU NFAT Facet · Cantina · 6 Jul 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowSome off-chain NFAT contracts may not be fully repayableSky: PAU NFAT Facet · Cantina · 6 Jul 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowLayerZero confirmation guarantees for CCIP-backed DVNs reduce to Chainlink CCIP finality assumptionsSky: CCIP DVN Adapter · Cantina · 24 Jun 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportShow 10 more
LowRequire prefunding the CCIPDVNAdapterSky: CCIP DVN Adapter · Cantina · 24 Jun 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowSource-side CCIPDVNAdapter makes CCIP mandatory for every packet emissionSky: CCIP DVN Adapter · Cantina · 24 Jun 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowUse of deprecated EVMExtraArgsV1 for CCIP messagesSky: CCIP DVN Adapter · Cantina · 24 Jun 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowDeploy script does not check the beacon is empty before wiring itPAU: Diamond PAU Deployment Scripts & Deployment R · Cantina · 10 Jun 2026Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowAave Pool Size ManipulationAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowArbitrary delegatecall within the SubProxyAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowAround 20% of locks can be blocked statisticallyAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowAuction parameters may change mid flightAcknowledged
There are several parameters in an auction that are deeply involved in tuning it, such as `cusp`, `tail`, `chip` or `tip`. In standard auctions, these parameters(or what they represent in terms of tuning) are usually set before the auction begins and held immutable until the end so that behaviour can be more predictable and fair to users and operators. However, it appears that in `Clipper`, all of these parameters can be mutated via `Clipper.file` at any time. This would mean that potentially an auction could be in flight and a subsequent parameter change in `file` abruptly stops the auction due to a `cusp` or `tail` decrement.
LowContracts may have no authorized wardAcknowledged
There is nothing preventing the single authorized address/user from calling `deny()` on themselves. This would cause the user to lock themselves out since they will no longer be able to call any function protected by the `auth` modifier in the smart contract.
LowCurrent diamond-pau changes that affect SparkAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
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LowCurveLib.swap minAmountOut check is less conservative due to additional truncationAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowDifferent setup between devnet and mainnetAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowDisable Plan Without EventAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Lowend.skim() May Leave ink BehindAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowFees can be trimmedAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowGate1 Withdraw TimestampAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowgetOrCreateProxy() or proxy[msg.sender]Acknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Lowgush ignores total vat.Line() debt ceilingAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowImmutable InterestRateModelAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowIncorrect initialization behaviorAcknowledged
1. [ACKNOWLEDGED] The specification indicates that the `Clipper.dog` should be authorized to call `kick`. However, the `Clipper.constructor` does not set `wards[dog] = 1`. 2. [MITIGATED] The `cut` in the `StairstepExponentialDecrease.constructor` is set to zero. This is not good, because it will lead to the `price` function returning zero. It is also not inline with the specification, which gives an example of `cut = 0.99 * RAY`.
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LowInefficient _validateAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowL2 Farm's reward rate might not be constantAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowLeftover ClaimsAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Lowlocking and freeing from LockstakeEngine can fail if ilk.dust increasesAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowMismatches With Documentation and Lack ThereofAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowMissing input validationAcknowledged
The majority of auth-ed functions do not have any input parameter validation in place, which could lead to unexpected values being set by authenticated accounts. The following list contains a few instances of such functions, however, the list is not exhaustive as it would be too long: 1. `Clipper.setBreaker` does not check the value of `level` and therefore the circuit breaker could be set to any unsigned integer value. In the current code, this is not a problem as the `isStopped` modifier uses the less-than (<) sign. However, it could be problematic if some service listens for `SetBreaker` events and it doesn’t expect any values other than 0, 1 and 2. 2. `Clipper.file` does not check if the value of the `data` parameter corresponding to each value of what is in the right range. For example, `buf` seems to always need to be higher than 100%, while `chip` and `cusp` should always be less than 100%. `tail` should always be greater than zero. 3. `Dog.file` does not check if the value of the `data` parameter corresponding to each value of what is in the right range. For example, `chop` should probably never be 0; `Hole` and `hole` should also never be zero. 4. `LinearDecrease.file` does not check if the value of the `data` parameter corresponding to each value of what is in the right range. For example, `tau` should always be greater than 0, otherwise the `price` function will throw due to a division-by-zero error. 5. `StairstepExponentialDecrease.file` does not check if the value of the `data` parameter corresponding to each value of what is in the right range. For example, `step` should always be greater than 0, otherwise the `price` function will throw due to a division-by-zero error. Also `cut` should always be greater than 0, otherwise the `price` function will return 0.
LowOptimization of auth ModifierAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowOracle delay may lead to `redo`-ing and bad debtAcknowledged
In `Clipper`, the auction sets the `top` price as a function of the OSM result. It is stated in the MIP45 specification that: > Note that the current OSM price is between one and two hours delayed relative to the actual market price. This means that there is a possibility that the actual market price could be sufficiently under the OSM price that the Keepers have no incentive `take`, therefore leading to incomplete auctions that `redo`. Every `redo` incentivizes callers with `tip` and `chip` which is funded from `vat`, thereby draining it slowly. Auctions which are incomplete for longer amounts of time run a higher risk of accumulating bad debt. Combined, they may cause a persistent overall value loss. The potential loss is scaled by the length of the OSM delay, since this plausible event is bounded by it. This issue was foreshadowed by [MIP45c21](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip45-liquidations-2-0-liq-2-0-liquidation-system-redesign/6352#MIP45c21) and [MIP45c23](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip45-liquidations-2-0-liq-2-0-liquidation-system-redesign/6352#MIP45c23) of the specification, and can be thought of as similar but not the same due to the focus on the oracle delay.
LowPossible Gas Optimization for MappingsAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowPossible OptimizationsAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
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LowPrecision Loss in rewardRate CalculationAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowPrivileged Roles and OwnershipAcknowledged
Smart contracts will often have `owner` variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. In these contracts we have a homemade authentication system that guards key functions such as `file`, `cage`, `yank` or `setBreaker`. Whilst it is understood these contracts are designed with a multilateral governance system in mind for the privileged role, it is important to note the potential impact.
LowRate and urnImplementation Not ValidatedAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowRate-limit accounting is inconsistent across request/cancel and unwind flowsAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowRedundant External CallsAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowRestrict Configurator updates to BeamState-defined rate-limit keysAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowReward tokens can be retrieved from StakingContractAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowSkip Calls When No Additional Debt Is NeededAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowSlice at Timestamp With No RateAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowSolana ⇔ EVM rate limiter differencesAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
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LowSolidity rounding dust can accumulate in the StakingRewardsAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowStaking rewards are not distributed linearlyAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowTemporary DoS Due to Max Deposit in MetamorphoAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowThe AutoLine can be called immediately after initializationAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowThe implementation must be trustedAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowThe rewards will be lost between first notifyRewardAmount and first stakeAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowTips may not be enough to cover gas fees when network is congestedAcknowledged
The purpose of the `tip` state variable is to incentivize keepers to call `bark` such that they would be reimbursed for the gas fee. However, since this is a flat fee, it may not cover the gas costs when the network is highly congested and the gas prices are high.
LowTransferring gem out of pocket breaks PSMAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowTwo separate auth systems can result in mistakesAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowUncallable functions on implementation contractAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
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LowUnchecked Return Value of transferFromAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowUniswapV3 removeLiquidity requires an active withdraw limit even for the zero-output sideAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
LowUnlocked PragmaAcknowledged
Every Solidity file scoped specifies in the header a version number of the format `pragma solidity >=0.6.11`. The greater-or-equal (`>=`) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version _and above_, hence the term "unlocked".
LowUnnecessary Additional TransfersAcknowledged
The report gives no description here.
Contracts1
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xdc035d45d973e3ec169d2276ddab16f1e407384f | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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