StakeStone security record

Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Ethereum, Scrollstakestone.ioX

As of 19 Nov 2026, StakeStone has 4 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 14 Oct 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings.

Critical findings
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Across 4 reports.
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits4

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
StakeStone Tokenized VaultSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
StakeStone VaultSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files listedNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
StakeStone StoneBTC and VaultSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files listedNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
StakeStoneSecurity firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Repository at commit d34a1ecNone opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗

Findings35

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High0000
Medium0251
Low0790

Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firms. Not counted as findings.

InformationalBlacklisted Users Cannot Recover Withdrawal SharesStakeStone Tokenized Vault · Quantstamp · 14 Oct 2025Acknowledged

Users can request withdrawals while whitelisted, but if blacklisted afterward, their shares become permanently stuck in `WithdrawController`. Both completion and cancellation fail due to blacklist restrictions on token transfers.

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UndeterminedContract Allows for 100% Credit UtilizationStakeStone Vault · Quantstamp · 25 Oct 2024Acknowledged

The `ASSET_MANAGEMENT_ROLE` can call `AssetVault.withdrawFromVault()` and `AssetVault.repayVault()` to transfer the deposited underlying tokens to asset managers and accrue yield. However, there is no restriction to how much of the reserves can be transferred, as the contract allows withdrawing the entire underlying token balance. We would like to note that the protocol maintaining solvency relies on the asset managers used by the StakeStone team. These asset managers are outside the scope of this audit.

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InformationalDonate to Prevent Token Removal From VaultStakeStone Vault · Quantstamp · 25 Oct 2024Acknowledged

The `removeUnderlyingToken()` function ensures that the contract's balance for a specific token is zero before removing it from the token list. However, since it relies on the `IERC20.balanceOf()` function, an attacker can disrupt this function by donating a very small amount of the token to the contract. This will cause the balance check to fail, preventing the token from being removed.

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InformationalPotential Inflation Attack During Initial DepositStakeStone Vault · Quantstamp · 25 Oct 2024Acknowledged

During the very first deposit to the vault, a malicious actor could front-run legitimate deposits and donate additional funds to inflate the LP token price. This manipulation may prevent subsequent depositors from receiving the correct amount of LP tokens, effectively reducing their share. Without the Proof of Reserve (PoR) oracle implementation within the scope, we cannot assess whether this inflation attack is feasible. However, this is a known vulnerability in typical vault designs if not properly addressed.

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InformationalCentralized Veto Right for ProposalsStakeStone StoneBTC and Vault · Quantstamp · 10 Sep 2024Acknowledged

The `Proposal` contract allows `StoneBTC` holders to vote on protocol decisions for the `StoneBTCVault` and either support or reject the proposals made by the `PROPOSE_ROLE`. However, the `EXECUTE_ROLE` has a veto right on any passed proposal in that the role can decide to never execute the proposal.

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UndeterminedVoting Power Can only Be Used for One Poll at a TimeStakeStone StoneBTC and Vault · Quantstamp · 10 Sep 2024Acknowledged

The `Proposal` contract allows users to vote their stoneBTC for only one poll at a time. Only after the vote is closed can the user retrieve the tokens they used and allocate them to another vote. At the same time, it is possible for the `PROPOSE_ROLE` to create several polls at a time, effectively diluting the voting power across these polls.

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UndeterminedMissing Comparison with Last PriceStakeStone · Quantstamp · 25 Jul 2024Acknowledged

The function `_depositFor()` compares the price obtained from the call to `currentSharePrice()` with that of the previous round to adjust for the best of both. The same comparison is not performed in`rollToNextRound()` while calculating `amountToWithdraw`, which may not be desirable.

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InformationalWithdrawals Can RevertStakeStone · Quantstamp · 25 Jul 2024Acknowledged

`StrategyController.forceWithdraw()` makes a call to `Strategy(strategy).instantWithdraw(withAmount)`. This function is expected to withdraw whatever funds possible and not revert (as opposed to `StrategyController._withdrawFromStrategy()` calling `Strategy(_strategy).withdraw(_amount)`). However, none of the current implementations of `Strategy.instantWithdraw()` correctly gather the requested funds. * `NativeLendingETHStrategy.instantWithdraw()`: Leaves potential funds in the LP token. * `SymbioticDepositWstETHStrategy.instantWithdraw()`: Is unable to syncronously withdraw additional ETH as it needs to submit withdrawal requests from Lido. * `EigenLSTRestaking.instantWithdraw()`: Is unable to syncronously withdraw additional ETH as it needs to submit withdrawal requests from Lido. All three of these functions will revert if the amount withdrawn exceeds the amount of ETH in the contract. With the current usages, this could prevent some users from being able to call `StoneVault.instantWithdraw()`. Additionally, it is possible for the implementations of `Strategy.withdraw()` to revert as well. This could result in blocking calls to `StrategyController._rebase()` until the admin makes the ETH available for each of the strategies. This will in turn prevent calls to `StoneVault.rollToNextRound()`.

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InformationalProcess the Same Withdrawal RequestStakeStone Vault · Quantstamp · 25 Oct 2024Fixed

The `processWithdrawals()` function may be vulnerable to reentrancy when interacting with tokens that have callback functionality, such as ERC777 tokens. If a user crafts a withdrawal request with such a token, the request could be processed multiple times, allowing the fulfilling user to process the request multiple times. While this does not necessarily result in a loss for the protocol, it allows the fulfilling user to exploit the withdrawal process to their advantage by processing the withdrawal request multiple times.

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Undetermined`Account.invoke()` Cannot Call the ControllerStakeStone · Quantstamp · 25 Jul 2024Fixed

The constructor in the `Account` contract has the following line: ``` controller = EigenStrategy(address(this)).controller(); ``` Rather than referring to an outside contract, `EigenStrategy` wraps `address(this)`. The `controller` variable is effectively assigned to itself and will remain zero, leading all calls to the controller in `invoke()` to revert. Additionally, `invoke()` may arbitrarily execute external contract calls when `value` equals zero.

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InformationalSome Proposals Can Make Stone Non-RefundableStakeStone · Quantstamp · 25 Jul 2024Fixed

Voters stake their STONE into the `Proposal` contract under the pretense that they can withdraw their STONE after the proposal has completed. Executing a proposal involves calling `Proposal.invoke()`, which calls `stoneVault.call{value: 0}(data)`. If a proposal passes that calls `StoneVault.requestWithdraw()`, it will use the STONE that was staked by voters into the `Proposal` contract. This will make it impossible to return STONE to all voters. Given this exploit scenario would have to be approved by voters, the severity has been left as Informational.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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