STYLE Protocol has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 3 Jun 2024; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 6 low (6 open, 4 acknowledged).
Centralization Risks in STYLE-vesting-flattend.so
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Potential Phishing Attacks
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Risk of Overflow/Underflow Due to Extensive Use o
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
`_owner` unused in `VestingWalletHolder`
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Check Effect Interaction Pattern (Out-of-Order Ev
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Check Effect Interaction Pattern Violated (Increm
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Deprecate ERC777 Implementation
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Input Validation on `VestingWallet.initia
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Unused Interface
Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Style Protocol | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 3 high · 1 medium · 6 low 4 acknowledged · 6 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 6 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `VestingWalletHolder`, a state variable `_owner` is defined: ```solidity=1793 address private immutable _owner; ``` it is set during the deployment ```solidity=1843 constructor() { _vestingWalletImplementation = payable(address(new VestingWallet())); _owner = msg.sender; } ``` And it is never used even if an `onlyOwner` modifier is defined: ```solidity=1798 modifier onlyOwner() { if (_owner == msg.sender) { _; } else { revert ImproperOwner(); } } ```
Open the reportA reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. *This finding is considered minor because the reentrancy only causes out-of-order events.* ### External call(s) ```solidity=1553 IERC20(token).safeTransfer(_beneficiary, releasable); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `SafeERC20._callOptionalReturn`, * `returndata = address(token).functionCall(data)` * In `Address.functionCallWithValue`, * `(success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data)` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1555 emit ERC20Release(token, releasable); ``` --- ### External call(s) ```solidity=1636 Address.sendValue(payable(to), amount); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `Address.sendValue`, * `(success,None) = recipient.call{value: amount}("")` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1638 emit EtherWithdraw(amount); ``` --- ### External call(s) ```solidity=1650 IERC20(token).safeTransfer(to, amount); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `SafeERC20._callOptionalReturn`, * `returndata = address(token).functionCall(data)` * In `Address.functionCallWithValue`, * `(success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data)` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1652 emit ERC20Withdraw(token, amount); ``` --- ### External call(s) ```solidity=1860 IVestingWallet(clone).initialize(beneficiary, start, duration); ``` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1864 emit CreateVesting(clone); ```
Open the reportA reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. *This finding is considered minor because the state variable is only incremented or decremented. So, the effect of out-of-order increments may be unobservable after transaction. However, the reentrancy vulnerability may still cause other issues in the middle of transaction.* ### External call(s) ```solidity=1860 IVestingWallet(clone).initialize(beneficiary, start, duration); ``` ### State variables written after the call(s) ```solidity=1861 _contracts[msg.sender][_vestingcounts[msg.sender]] = clone; ``` ```solidity=1862 ++_vestingcounts[msg.sender]; ```
Open the reportThe ERC777 standard is not recommended due to concerns regarding over-engineering, potential security vulnerabilities, and unnecessary complexity.
Open the reportIn `VestingWallet.initialize()`, no check is made on the `_beneficiary` address.
Open the reportThe smart contract contains one or more inteface definitions that are not used, which can lead to unnecessary complexity and reduced maintainability. ```solidity=1127 interface IERC20Permit { ``` - `IERC20Permit` is declared but never used.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for STYLE Protocol, dated 3 Jun 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Style Protocol”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for STYLE Protocol.
10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 6 low (6 open, 4 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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