STYLE Protocol audit reports

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STYLE Protocol has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 3 Jun 2024; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm10

Statuses are the security firms’ own

10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 6 low (6 open, 4 acknowledged).

High
3
Medium
1
Low
6
  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in STYLE-vesting-flattend.so

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Initial Token Distribution

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Potential Phishing Attacks

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Medium Acknowledged

    Risk of Overflow/Underflow Due to Extensive Use o

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    `_owner` unused in `VestingWalletHolder`

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Check Effect Interaction Pattern (Out-of-Order Ev

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Check Effect Interaction Pattern Violated (Increm

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Deprecate ERC777 Implementation

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Input Validation on `VestingWallet.initia

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Unused Interface

    Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Style ProtocolSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 3 high · 1 medium · 6 low
4 acknowledged · 6 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings10

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High030
Medium010
Low600
Low`_owner` unused in `VestingWalletHolder`Style Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024Open

In the contract `VestingWalletHolder`, a state variable `_owner` is defined: ```solidity=1793 address private immutable _owner; ``` it is set during the deployment ```solidity=1843 constructor() { _vestingWalletImplementation = payable(address(new VestingWallet())); _owner = msg.sender; } ``` And it is never used even if an `onlyOwner` modifier is defined: ```solidity=1798 modifier onlyOwner() { if (_owner == msg.sender) { _; } else { revert ImproperOwner(); } } ```

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LowCheck Effect Interaction Pattern (Out-of-Order EvStyle Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024Open

A reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. *This finding is considered minor because the reentrancy only causes out-of-order events.* ### External call(s) ```solidity=1553 IERC20(token).safeTransfer(_beneficiary, releasable); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `SafeERC20._callOptionalReturn`, * `returndata = address(token).functionCall(data)` * In `Address.functionCallWithValue`, * `(success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data)` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1555 emit ERC20Release(token, releasable); ``` --- ### External call(s) ```solidity=1636 Address.sendValue(payable(to), amount); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `Address.sendValue`, * `(success,None) = recipient.call{value: amount}("")` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1638 emit EtherWithdraw(amount); ``` --- ### External call(s) ```solidity=1650 IERC20(token).safeTransfer(to, amount); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `SafeERC20._callOptionalReturn`, * `returndata = address(token).functionCall(data)` * In `Address.functionCallWithValue`, * `(success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data)` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1652 emit ERC20Withdraw(token, amount); ``` --- ### External call(s) ```solidity=1860 IVestingWallet(clone).initialize(beneficiary, start, duration); ``` ### Events emitted after the call(s) ```solidity=1864 emit CreateVesting(clone); ```

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LowCheck Effect Interaction Pattern Violated (IncremStyle Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024Open

A reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. *This finding is considered minor because the state variable is only incremented or decremented. So, the effect of out-of-order increments may be unobservable after transaction. However, the reentrancy vulnerability may still cause other issues in the middle of transaction.* ### External call(s) ```solidity=1860 IVestingWallet(clone).initialize(beneficiary, start, duration); ``` ### State variables written after the call(s) ```solidity=1861 _contracts[msg.sender][_vestingcounts[msg.sender]] = clone; ``` ```solidity=1862 ++_vestingcounts[msg.sender]; ```

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LowDeprecate ERC777 ImplementationStyle Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024Open

The ERC777 standard is not recommended due to concerns regarding over-engineering, potential security vulnerabilities, and unnecessary complexity.

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LowMissing Input Validation on `VestingWallet.initiaStyle Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024Open

In `VestingWallet.initialize()`, no check is made on the `_beneficiary` address.

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LowUnused InterfaceStyle Protocol · CertiK · 3 Jun 2024Open

The smart contract contains one or more inteface definitions that are not used, which can lead to unnecessary complexity and reduced maintainability. ```solidity=1127 interface IERC20Permit { ``` - `IERC20Permit` is declared but never used.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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The repositories and files the reports name

STYLE Protocol: questions

Is STYLE Protocol audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for STYLE Protocol, dated 3 Jun 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Style Protocol”).

Who audited STYLE Protocol?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for STYLE Protocol.

Are there open findings in STYLE Protocol’s audits?

10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 6 low (6 open, 4 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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