Swell security record
As of 30 Oct 2026, Swell has 10 audit reports by 6 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by CODESPECT, dated 17 Apr 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits10
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Swell - Repricing Oracle Update | Security firm: CODESPECT | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · IPFS |
| Swell - Withdrawal Update | Security firm: CODESPECT | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · IPFS |
| swBTC Smart Contracts | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Symbiotic-Aera Adapter | Security firm: ChainSecurity | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · chainsecurity.com |
| Swell L2 Pre Deposit security review | Security firm: Hexens | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Swell security review | Security firm: Hexens | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Swell Audit Report | Security firm: Cyfrin | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Swell security review | Security firm: Hexens | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Barracuda security review | Security firm: Sigma Prime | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Swell Network Addendum | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings42
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Low | 0 | 8 | 26 |
HighInconsistencies in updates to `userRecords`Swell Network Addendum · CertiK · 28 Nov 2022Fixed
In the function `_registerDeposit()`, only the `balance` of a `_user` address is updated in the `userRecords` mapping. The struct variable `entryRPT` is not updated; this means that when the same `_user` address withdraws, their `record.entryRPT` will read as 0 (even if they deposited their tokens at a point in time when the sum was larger) and as a result, they will be privy to the all-time running sum `rewardPerToken` corresponding to the reward token address. Since their balance is updated, provided the `rpt` is positive, a user who goes through `_registerDeposit()` for their first deposit gets the full `rpt` value applied to the amount added to `unclaimedRewards`, either through a second deposit that goes through `_depositRewards()` or withdrawing through `_withdrawRewards()`. The function `_depositRewards()`, however, does not provide the same record-keeping for a first-time depositor. A user who deposits through `_depositRewards()` for the first time has an update to their `record.unclaimedRewards` that is 0 (since `record.balance` is 0 at that point). However, their `record.entryRPT` is updated to be the `rpt` value at the time of deposit. This means the next time this same user deposits or withdraws through `_depositRewards()` or `_withdrawRewards()`, their value for `record.unclaimedRewards` is only scaled by `rpt - record.entryRPT`, where `record.entryRPT` is nonzero. The issue appears to be that two users, both depositing for the first time, may have two different outcomes dependent upon whether the call to `auraBaseRewardPool.getReward()` yields a positive `tokenBalance` amount. It also appears possible that a user may both deposit tokens for a period of time and withdraw these tokens without ever receiving rewards. Such an instance appears to occur if the user happens to deposit tokens through the `_depositRewards()` function (in which case record.unclaimedRewards is still 0 after update), and then withdraws through the `_registerWithdraw()` function, where `record.unclaimedRewards` is also no updated for the user. Which functions are called is dependent upon whether `auraBaseRewardPool.getReward()` yields a nonzero `tokenBalance` for the contract.
Open the reportMediumDouble Accounting for SlashingSwell - Repricing Oracle Update · CODESPECT · 17 Apr 2025Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumIncorrect Withdrawal Amount When Opening Multiple RequestsswBTC Smart Contracts · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumWithdrawals Can Be DOS by a Malicious UserswBTC Smart Contracts · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumSwellLib.BOT can delete active validators when bot methods are pausedSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumSwellLib.BOT can subtly rug-pull withdrawals by setting _processedRate = 0 when calling swEXIT::processWithdrawalsSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumERC721 safe mint reentrancy can lead to draining withdrawalsSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowAeraStrategy May Have Locked FundsswBTC Smart Contracts · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowAllowances Not Updated When Changing VaultswBTC Smart Contracts · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowLocked SharesswBTC Smart Contracts · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportShow 10 more
LowSetting a Wrong Address as the vaultAera Can DOSswBTC Smart Contracts · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowSlashing Penalties AvoidanceSymbiotic-Aera Adapter · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowVyper VersionswBTC Smart Contracts · ChainSecurity · 6 Sep 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowZap balance check optimisationSwell L2 Pre Deposit security review · Hexens · 3 Apr 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowChanging the cooldown time may result in funds being unexpectedly locked for a longer timeSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Mar 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowGas inefficient way of handling user requestsSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Mar 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowLack of upper limit check for lock duration allows freezing of assetsSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Mar 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowAllowing anyone to finalize any withdrawal can lead to integration problems for smart contract allowed to receive ETHSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowCheck for staleness of data when fetching Proof of Reserves via Chainlink Swell ETH PoR OracleSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowMultiple attack paths to force swETH::reprice to revert by increasing or decreasing swETH total supplySwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportShow 10 more
LowNodeOperatorRegistry::updateOperatorControllingAddress allows to override _newOperatorAddress if its address is already assigned to an operator IDSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowPrecision loss in swETH::_deposit from unnecessary hidden division before multiplicationSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowRewards unable to be distributed when all active validators are deleted during repricingSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowswExit::getProcessedRateForTokenId returns true with valid processedRate for non-existent tokenId inputSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowswEXIT::setWithdrawRequestMaximum and setWithdrawRequestMinimum lacking validation can lead to a state where withdrawRequestMinimum > withdrawRequestMaximumSwell Audit Report · Cyfrin · 23 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowChainLink data feed staleness is not checkedSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowNode operator reward distribution should be minted instead of transferredSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowNode operator reward per validator can be pre-calculated in repricingSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowUnused timestamp variable in withdrawal requestsSwell security review · Hexens · 12 Feb 2024Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowCheck Effect Interaction Pattern ViolatedSwell Network Addendum · CertiK · 28 Nov 2022Fixed
The order of external call/transfer and storage manipulation must follow the check-effect-interaction pattern. - In `_beforePositionChange()`: The function `_withdrawFromAura()` makes an external call before the updates to state performed in `_rewardsBeforeWithdraw()`. - In `_afterPositionChange()`: The function `_depositToAura()` makes an external call before the updates to state performed in function `_rewardsAfterDeposit()`.
Open the reportShow 3 more
LowLogic allows `_withdrawAmount` to be larger thanSwell Network Addendum · CertiK · 28 Nov 2022Fixed
In functions `_registerWithdraw()` and `_withdrawRewards()`, the `record.balance` for the input address `_user` is updated to subtract away the `_amount` to be withdrawn. However, the logic for updating the `record.balance` is as follows: ```solidity record.balance -= _amount > record.balance ? record.balance : _amount; ``` which allows `_amount` to be larger than the value for `record.balance` without causing a revert of the transaction. While in most cases, a user calling `withdraw()` with a higher value for `assets` than they own will cause a revert, if there is a difference in `msg.sender` and `tx.origin`, this facilitates `tx.origin` in using a call for a withdrawal transaction that may be larger than the recorded `record.balance` for `tx.origin` to gain rewards.
Open the reportLowMissing Input ValidationSwell Network Addendum · CertiK · 28 Nov 2022Fixed
There is no check that the input `_params.platformFee` for the constructor is in an acceptable range for its use as `platformFee` within the `SwellAuraVault` contract. Similarly, there is no check that the input `fee` for function `configurePlatformFee()` is within an acceptable range for its use as `platformFee`.
Open the reportLowMissing Zero Address ValidationSwell Network Addendum · CertiK · 28 Nov 2022Fixed
Addresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses. ```solidity=38 _params.asset; ``` - `_params.asset` is not zero-checked before being set.
Open the reportContracts2
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xc94cffd5249df4008a043ee61e13f19af16d0936 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xd5a73c748449a45cc7d9f21c7ed3ab9eb3d2e959 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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