Tezoro security record
As of 21 Oct 2026, Tezoro has 2 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Oak Security, dated 15 May 2026. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits2
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tezoro audit | Security firm: Oak Security | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Tezoro - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings29
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 1 | 21 |
HighremoveStrategy clears live strategy accounting and understates assetsTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportHighStale trackedBalance misprices deposits and redemptions between reconcile callsTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportHighUnderdelivering strategy exits can block normal withdrawalsTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportHighUnswept base-asset rewards let new depositors capture prior yieldTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportHighWithdrawals can erase stale balances and reopen cheap entryTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowAave emergency withdrawal reverts and misclassifies recoverable funds as lostTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowEarly withdrawals can shift exit losses onto later usersTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowFee hikes can overcharge old unreconciled yieldTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowFull-share FluidStrategy emergency redemption misclassifies recoverable funds as lostTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowMissing baseToken validation strands CompoundV3Strategy funds in collateral modeTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportShow 10 more
LowMissing timelock expiry window enabling stale proposal executionTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowOpaque claim and swap calldata can redirect rewardsTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowPause-insensitive liquidity estimates overstate ERC-4626 withdrawal limitsTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowPaused strategies keep allowance and can still pullTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowRecalled strategies keep approval and may pull vault assetsTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowRedeem fallback underquotes shares and leaves sub-vault liquidity unreachableTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowremoveStrategy can orphan paused Aave positions and underprice sharesTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowReverting sub-vault views distort vault NAV and make healthy liquidity unreachableTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowRewards module rotation can trap base assetTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowStale yield can let deposits bypass the capTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportShow 6 more
LowTiny interactions can raise highWaterMark without feesTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowUnhealthy strategies can keep funds after de-riskingTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowUnrevoked sub-vault allowances allow frozen children to pull idle strategy assetsTezoro audit · Oak Security · 15 May 2026Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowLack of DocumentationTezoro - Audit · CertiK · 14 Jul 2023Fixed
During the audit, the auditors were not able to gain access to the documentation of the project. Detailed documentation could benefit future code reviewers and improve the project's transparency.
Open the reportLowMissing Zero Address ValidationTezoro - Audit · CertiK · 14 Jul 2023Fixed
Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring tokens to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of those tokens. ```solidity=56 executor1 = _executor1; ``` - `_executor1` is not zero-checked before being used. --- ```solidity=57 executor2 = _executor2; ``` - `_executor2` is not zero-checked before being used.
Open the reportLowPotential Reentrancy AttackTezoro - Audit · CertiK · 14 Jul 2023Fixed
A reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. ### External call(s) ```solidity=98 ERC20(tokenAddress).safeTransferFrom( owner, beneficiary, amountToTransfer ); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `SafeERC20._callOptionalReturn`, * `returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,"SafeERC20: low-level call failed")` * In `Address.functionCallWithValue`, * `(success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data)` ### State variables written after the call(s) ```solidity=117 state = _state; ``` ```solidity=118 timestamp = block.timestamp + delay; ```
Open the reportContracts1
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xfac6d13632bee2b0dab04f959c58d69a92a3b174 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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