TokenFi security record

BNB Chain, Ethereumtokenfi.comXGitHub

As of 3 Nov 2026, TokenFi has 2 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by CertiK, dated 6 Feb 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings.

Critical findings
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Across 2 reports.
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Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits2

Newest first

AuditSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsReport
TokenFi Token LauncherSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com
TokenFiSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files named in the reportNo open critical findingsOpen · skynet.certik.com

Findings58

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High320
Medium3011
Low15024
HighCentralized Related RisksTokenFi Token Launcher · CertiK · 6 Feb 2024Acknowledged

In the contract `AccessControl`, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `grantRole()`, grant any role to any account. - `revokeRole()`, revoke any role from any account. In the contract `TokenLauncherERC1155` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `updateTokenLauncherStore()`, set malicious token launcher store contract address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8cc3-ca3ef8e0-a803-af434d8b4ab7/diagrams/centralization_TokenLauncherERC1155-TokenLauncherERC1155-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `TokenLauncherERC20` the token contract `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the token contract `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `updateBuyBackDetails()`, update to the malicious buy back details. In the contract `TokenLauncherERC20` the `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `updateTokenLauncherStore()`, set malicious token launcher store contract address. - `updateBuyBackHandler()`, update buyback handler contract. In the contract `TokenLauncherERC721` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `updateTokenLauncherStore()`, set malicious token launcher store contract address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8cc3-ca3ef8e0-a803-af434d8b4ab7/diagrams/centralization_TokenLauncherERC721-TokenLauncherERC721-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `TokenLauncherStore` the role `REGISTER_LIQUIDITY_POOL_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `REGISTER_LIQUIDITY_POOL_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `registerLiquidityPool()`, register liquidity pool contract. In the contract `TokenLauncherStore` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `addToken()`, add invalid token contract to store. - `updatePaymentModule()`, update `TokenLauncherPaymentModuleV1` contract. - `updatePricingModule()`, update `TokenLauncherPricingModuleV1` contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8cc3-ca3ef8e0-a803-af434d8b4ab7/diagrams/centralization_TokenLauncherStore-TokenLauncherStore-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `TokenLauncherStore` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `updateTokenOwner()`, maliciously update token owner. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8cc3-ca3ef8e0-a803-af434d8b4ab7/diagrams/centralization_TokenLauncherStore-TokenLauncherStore-owner.svg) In the contract `BuyBackHandler` the role `BUYBACK_CALLER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `BUYBACK_CALLER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `buyBack()`, maliciously use assets held by `BuyBackHandler` contract to add liquidity. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-8cc3-ca3ef8e0-a803-af434d8b4ab7/diagrams/centralization_BuyBackHandler-BuyBackHandler-BUYBACK_CALLER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BuyBackHandler` the `role admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `role admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `grantRole()`, grant role to specific account. In the contract `BuyBackHandler` the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `withdraw()`, withdraw assets from `BuyBackHandler` contract. In the contract `TokenLauncherLiquidityPoolFactoryV1` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - `setVaultFactory()`, set malicious vault factory contract. - `createV2Liquidity

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HighInitial Token DistributionTokenFi Token Launcher · CertiK · 6 Feb 2024Acknowledged

All of the initial TokenFi ERC20 tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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