TourismX has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 12 Oct 2022; no critical findings reported. It also holds 3 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open).
Centralization Risks in TokenVesting.sol
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Function Should Be Declared External
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Lack of input validation
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Missing events
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Unnecessary BNB related implementation
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Unnecessary use of SafeMath
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Unused return value
TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit · CertiK · 12 Oct 2022 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 3 addresses on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 6 low 8 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 6 | 0 | 0 |
Several contracts throughout the project, implement and rely on privileged roles to modify configuration variables. Having this role and functionality allows the project to implement dynamic adjustments to the protocol that can be beneficial to both the deployer and users. However, it also introduces a single point of failure that can compromise the whole protocol. In the `TokenVesting` contract, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - `TokenVesting.setSellContract`: Changes the contract that interacts with the contract `TokenVesting` - `TokenVesting.createVestingSchedule`: Create vesting schedules - `TokenVesting.revoke`: Revoke vesting schedules - `TokenVesting.withdraw`: Withdraw `_token` up to the amount not vested In the `TokenVesting` contract, the address `sellContract` has authority over the following function: - `TokenVesting.createVestingSchedule`: Create vesting schedules In the `TourismXToken` contract, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - `TourismXToken.pause`: Pause token transfer - `TourismXToken.unpause`" Unpause token transfer In the `Sell` contract, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - `Sell.setVestingContract`: Change the `vestingContract` to be called - `Sell.setPayToken`: Change the `payToken` used to start vesting - `Sell.setDuration`: Change the duration period to vesting reward - `Sell.setTokenPrice`: Change the price of the vesting token - `Sell.setSlicePeriodSeconds`: Change the time required to unlock a portion of the vesting reward - `Sell.setCliff`: Change the minimum time required to earn the vesting reward - `Sell.setRevocable`: Change whether a vesting schedule can be revoked or not
Open the reportDespite the comment on line 787 stating all tokens are minted and "transferred to the multi-sig owner wallet", all the tokens were initially minted to eight addresses and the [owner](https://bscscan.com/address/0xc2c6cefb6656ab6225dbef06ce1d9472643d2b96) of the contract is not a multi-sig wallet. Having the tokens minted to a few selected addresses poses a centralization risk and allows the addresses to drastically manipulate the supply and potentially price of the token. Furthermore, any compromise to these addresses can heavily impact the project.
Open the reportFunctions with external visibility are gas efficient compared to functions with public visibility. The following functions are declared `public` despite not being called internally and therefore can be declared `external` instead. In the contract `TokenVesting`: - `TokenVesting.setSellContract` - `TokenVesting.createVestingSchedule` - `TokenVesting.revoke` - `TokenVesting.withdraw` - `TokenVesting.getVestingSchedules` - `TokenVesting.getVestingSchedulesByOwner` - `TokenVesting.getAllVestingSchedules` - `TokenVesting.getLastVestingScheduleForHolder` In the contract `Sell`: - `Sell.setVestingContract` - `Sell.setPayToken` - `Sell.setDuration` - `Sell.setTokenPrice` - `Sell.setSlicePeriodSeconds` - `Sell.setCliff` - `Sell.setRevocable` - `Sell.buy`
Open the reportSeveral inputs are lacking input validation such as checking if an address is not zero or the start time is greater than the current block time. Other checks that may benefit include checking duration is greater than cliff. Such checks minimize unintended mistakes such as typos and help to keep the smart contract from functioning properly and as intended.
Open the reportEvents are missing throughout the project and should be emitted whenever state variables are modified and/or core functions are called. Having events benefit those monitoring the protocol to easily filter relevant events. The following functions can benefit from emitting events: In the contract `TokenVesting`: - `TokenVesting.setSellContract` - `TokenVesting.createVestingSchedule` - `TokenVesting.revoke` - `TokenVesting.withdraw` - `TokenVesting.release` In the contract `Sell`: - `Sell.constructor` - `Sell.setVestingContract` - `Sell.setPayToken` - `Sell.setDuration` - `Sell.setTokenPrice` - `Sell.setSlicePeriodSeconds` - `Sell.setCliff` - `Sell.setRevocable` - `Sell.buy`
Open the reportDespite the contract not requiring or using BNB, `fallback` and `receive` functions are implemented and addresses are casted to payable addresses. If a user unintentionally sends the BNB, there is currently no way of withdrawing this BNB and will be stuck in the contract.
Open the reportAs of Solidity version 0.8, arithmetic operations that result in overflow and underflow will automatically be reverted. Therefore the use of SafeMath is unnecessary and regular arithmetic operators such as `+`, `-`, `*`, and `/` can be used without integers underflowing or overflowing.
Open the reportThe current implementation does not revert the transaction when the transfer fails by returning a `false` value. If `payToken` is ever changed in the future, this can unexpectedly lead to the creation of vesting schedules despite the `payToken` not having properly transferred.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x882e…8c960x882e295c4b851df7a347679dab8c2489e9e58c96 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x7474…ca580x747470777fe622033271d465ce14ad7e316bca58 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xa647…58260xa6472bc7c0e2266034bb40edd8c6e8961cf45826 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for TourismX, dated 12 Oct 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“TourismX (TRMX ) - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for TourismX.
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="tourismx"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us