UNO.farm security record

In the contract `UnoFarmBalancer`, `UnoFarmQuickswapDual`, `UnoFarmQuickswap`, `UnoFarmSushiswap` and `UnoFarmTrisolarisStandard` the role `assetRouter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `assetRouter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority: - deposit tokens from this contract's balance to the vault through `deposit()` - withdraw funds and sends them to the recipient through `withdraw()` - claim rewards and re-investing rewards through `distribute()` 

To bridge the gap in trust between the administrators need to express a sincere attitude regarding the consideration of the administrator teamʼs anonymity. The `admin` of `UnoAutoStrategyFactory` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - approve an address for use as an AssetRouter through `approveAssetRouter()` - revoke Asset Router approval from an address through `revokeAssetRouter()` - upgrade all AutoStrategy contracts to a new implementation using Beacon Proxy through `upgradeStrategies()` The `pauser` of `UnoAutoStrategyFactory`, `UnoAssetRouterTrisolarisStandard` and `UnoAssetRouterTrisolarisStable` have the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - pause the contract through `pause()` - unpause the contract through `unpause()` The `admin` of `UnoAccessManager` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - grant role to account through `grantRole()` - revoke a role from the account through `revokeRole()` The `ADMIN_ROLE` of `UnoFarmFactory` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - upgrade farms through `upgradeFarms()`

The contracts mentioned above are upgradeable contracts, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the account, he can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

To bridge the gap in trust between the administrators need to express a sincere attitude regarding the consideration of the administrator teamʼs anonymity. The `LIQUIDITY_MANAGER_ROLE` of `UnoAutoStrategy` has the responsibility to notify users about the following capabilities: - move liquidity from one pool to another through `moveLiquidity()`

For upgradeable contracts, there must be storage gap to "allow developers to freely add new state variables in the future without compromising the storage compatibility with existing deployments". Otherwise it may be very difficult to write new implementation code. Without storage gap, the variable in child contract might be overwritten by the upgraded base contract if new variables are added to the base contract. Refer to https://docs.openzeppelin.com/upgrades-plugins/1.x/writing-upgradeable We noticed that there are several contracts that inherits upgradable contracts, but do not have storage gap.

If the function `moveLiquidity()` is called by the LIQUIDITY_MANAGER_ROLE and the user does not retrieve the leftover tokens in the contract in time, then when the LIQUIDITY_MANAGER_ROLE calls `moveLiquidity()` again, this part of the user's unretrieved assets will be invested again in the new pool which will be shared with other users.

The contracts mentioned above serves as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third-party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, which may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, third parties' upgrades can create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.