USDE (ERD) security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, USDE (ERD) has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by Quantstamp, dated 30 Oct 2023. That report lists no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum Reserve Dollar (ERD) | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Repository at commit 8023739 | No open critical findings | Open · certificate.quantstamp.com |
Findings33
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 9 | 2 |
| Low | 1 | 9 | 5 |
HighLiquidations Are Not Proportionally Funded by All TrovesEthereum Reserve Dollar (ERD) · Quantstamp · 30 Oct 2023Open
When active troves are liquidating other troves, assets are liquidated with respect to proportions of collateralized asset types. For example, for a trove that only holds rETH that gets liquidated, all of its rewards (collateral and debt) will go towards only troves that hold rETH. This could lead to scenarios where some troves take on a disproportionate amount of liquidated debt if they use a less popular collateral type. In the case of a particular collateral type taking a steep dive in price, this could lead to liquidation cascades. **At its most extreme, liquidating the last trove that holds a given collateral type may result in perpetually unclaimed debt.**
Open the reportHighOracle Manipulation with Flashloans Can Exploit Funds via LiquidationEthereum Reserve Dollar (ERD) · Quantstamp · 30 Oct 2023Open
The oracle contracts in ERD currently rely on Chainlink and Tellor oracles. Tellor is relied upon as a fallback oracle. However, Tellor's prices can be manipulated within the space of a block: reporting a price to Tellor only requires staking 10 TRB. Therefore, if Chainlink is ever determined by the oracle contracts to be frozen or broken, then an attacker may be able to buy USDE using a flashloan, deposit it in the stability pool, report a false price to Tellor and thereby trigger recovery mode, enabling the liquidation of all troves with TCR below 130%; part of the gains can be sold off to repay the flashloan.
Open the reportLowOwnership Can Be RenouncedEthereum Reserve Dollar (ERD) · Quantstamp · 30 Oct 2023Open
Contracts inheriting from `Ownable` or `OwnableUpgradeable` contain a function called `renounceOwnership()` which allows the owner to leave the contract without an owner. This would leave every function guarded by the `onlyOwner` modifier unable to be executed.
Open the reportContracts
No deployed address is recorded for these audits.
The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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