As of 25 Oct 2026, W3binfinity has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 9 Sep 2022. That report lists no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 12 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `WBYToken` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. - `setFee()`: Set fees for each transfer. - `setExcludeFee()`: Exclude an address from the fees. - `setMarketingAddress()`: Set the `marketAddress` to receive the fees from transfer. - `multiBlacklist()`: Add multiple addresses to the blacklist of the WBY contract. - `multiRemoveFromBlacklist()`: Remove multiple addresses to the blacklist of the WBY contract. - `wiToken()`: Withdraw all tokens from the contract. - `wiBNB()`: Withdraw all the BNB of the contract `WBYToken`. - `wiAmountBNB()`: Withdraw a certain amount of BNB from the `WBYToken` contract. - `wiAmountToken()` Withdraw any tokens from the contract. - `renounceOwnership()`: Set the owner to the address null. - `transferOwnership()`: Transfer the owner to another address. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and these functions. The attacker will be capable of modifying the **fees functions** or withdrawing all the tokens inside the `WBYToken` contract.
Open the reportUpon contract deployment, all of the tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a **centralization risk** as the deployer can distribute the tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. ```solidity=1257 ERC20._mint(_msgSender(), maxSupply); ```
Open the reportThe `fee` is set to 100% by default. This could lead to unexpected behavior. ```solidity=1247 uint256 fee = 100; ``` In this case, the action will disable the `transfer` function and thus **freeze** the contract until the `owner` decreases the value of the `fee`. Otherwise, there is no explicit restriction on the upper limit of the fee. Therefore, mistakenly setting the fee to 100 might lead to a Denial-of-Service situation. The auditors would like to know if this is the intended schema of the fee mechanism.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x4ecf…2dbe0x4ecfb318e6a0ecb81a6f82a269e40487b14a2dbe | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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