ZELIX security record
As of 3 Nov 2026, ZELIX has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 18 Aug 2023. That report lists no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits, findings and contracts up to Nov 2026, and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits1
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZELIX-Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | 1 critical finding, fixed | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings4
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 0 |
HighCentralization Risks in ZELIX.solZELIX-Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023Acknowledged
In the contract `ERC20Lockable` the role `_admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority to unlock tokens for any account and call `transferWithLockUp()` to transfer tokens and create a lock for the recipient.  In the contract `ERC20Lockable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set admin accounts.  In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `ZELIX` the role `_admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and blacklist any account from transferring tokens. 
Open the reportHighInitial Token DistributionZELIX-Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023Acknowledged
All of the ZELIX tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportContracts1
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x75198d07d7d6514efad683b635e967c55ca4ded8 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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