MXNB contract 0x72be…4e42 on Ethereum

0x72beddf7032eec58f199857b79a8e37020c14e42

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0x72beddf7032eec58f199857b79a8e37020c14e42 on Ethereum as a contract of MXNB. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 15 May 2024. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Ethereum.

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
MXNB Audit 2024CertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports3

1 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksMXNB Audit 2024 · CertiKOpen

In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the rescuer address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Rescuable-Rescuable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_rescuer` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_rescuer` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer tokens in this contract to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Rescuable-Rescuable-_rescuer.svg) ----- In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the blacklister address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Blacklistable-Blacklistable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `blacklister` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `blacklister` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add an account to the blacklist and remove the account from the blacklist. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Blacklistable-Blacklistable-blacklister.svg) ----- In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the master minter address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-_owner.svg) In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `masterMinter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `masterMinter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add or update a new minter with a mint allowance and remove a minter. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-masterMinter.svg) In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `minters` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `minters` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint fiat tokens to an address and allow minters to burn their own tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-minters.svg) ----- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and allow the current owner to transfer control of the contract to a new owner. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Ownable-Ownable-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `Pausable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the pauser address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Pausable-Pausable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Pausable` the role `pauser` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `pauser` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Pausable-Pausable-pauser.svg)

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowFunction `initialize()` Is UnprotectedMXNB Audit 2024 · CertiKOpen

The `initialize()` function is not called by another contract atomically after the contract is deployed, so it's possible for a malicious user to call `initialize()` which, if it's noticed in time, would require the project to re-deploy the contract in order to properly initialize. The functions `initializeV2()`, `initializeV2_1()` and `initializeV2_2()` have the same issue.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` FMXNB Audit 2024 · CertiKOpen

The change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The MXNB security record · Every MXNB address · This address on the explorer