MXNB Audit 2024

CertiK1 address on Ethereum

CertiK reviewed MXNB (MXNB Audit 2024) on 15 May 2024: 3 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen MXNB’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings3

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low200
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the rescuer address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Rescuable-Rescuable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_rescuer` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_rescuer` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer tokens in this contract to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Rescuable-Rescuable-_rescuer.svg) ----- In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the blacklister address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Blacklistable-Blacklistable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `blacklister` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `blacklister` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add an account to the blacklist and remove the account from the blacklist. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Blacklistable-Blacklistable-blacklister.svg) ----- In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the master minter address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-_owner.svg) In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `masterMinter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `masterMinter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add or update a new minter with a mint allowance and remove a minter. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-masterMinter.svg) In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `minters` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `minters` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint fiat tokens to an address and allow minters to burn their own tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-minters.svg) ----- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and allow the current owner to transfer control of the contract to a new owner. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Ownable-Ownable-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `Pausable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the pauser address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Pausable-Pausable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Pausable` the role `pauser` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `pauser` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Pausable-Pausable-pauser.svg)

LowFunction `initialize()` Is UnprotectedOpen

The `initialize()` function is not called by another contract atomically after the contract is deployed, so it's possible for a malicious user to call `initialize()` which, if it's noticed in time, would require the project to re-deploy the contract in order to properly initialize. The functions `initializeV2()`, `initializeV2_1()` and `initializeV2_2()` have the same issue.

LowPull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` FOpen

The change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x72beddf7032eec58f199857b79a8e37020c14e42Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

Part of MXNB’s security record

MXNB
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit May 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open MXNB’s security record

Security firm

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