MXNB audit reports

Ethereummxnb.mx

MXNB has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 15 May 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm3

Statuses are the security firms’ own

3 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 low (all open).

High
1
Low
2
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    MXNB Audit 2024 · CertiK · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Function `initialize()` Is Unprotected

    MXNB Audit 2024 · CertiK · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Pull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` F

    MXNB Audit 2024 · CertiK · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
MXNB Audit 2024Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on EthereumNone openFindings: 1 high · 2 low
3 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings3

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low200
HighCentralization Related RisksMXNB Audit 2024 · CertiK · 15 May 2024Open

In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the rescuer address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Rescuable-Rescuable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_rescuer` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_rescuer` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer tokens in this contract to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Rescuable-Rescuable-_rescuer.svg) ----- In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the blacklister address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Blacklistable-Blacklistable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `blacklister` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `blacklister` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add an account to the blacklist and remove the account from the blacklist. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Blacklistable-Blacklistable-blacklister.svg) ----- In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the master minter address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-_owner.svg) In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `masterMinter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `masterMinter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add or update a new minter with a mint allowance and remove a minter. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-masterMinter.svg) In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `minters` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `minters` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint fiat tokens to an address and allow minters to burn their own tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_FiatTokenV1-FiatTokenV1-minters.svg) ----- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and allow the current owner to transfer control of the contract to a new owner. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Ownable-Ownable-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `Pausable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the pauser address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Pausable-Pausable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Pausable` the role `pauser` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `pauser` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-0254-caff1d80-8250-9febe52c5320/diagrams/centralization_Pausable-Pausable-pauser.svg)

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LowFunction `initialize()` Is UnprotectedMXNB Audit 2024 · CertiK · 15 May 2024Open

The `initialize()` function is not called by another contract atomically after the contract is deployed, so it's possible for a malicious user to call `initialize()` which, if it's noticed in time, would require the project to re-deploy the contract in order to properly initialize. The functions `initializeV2()`, `initializeV2_1()` and `initializeV2_2()` have the same issue.

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LowPull-Over-Push Pattern In `transferOwnership()` FMXNB Audit 2024 · CertiK · 15 May 2024Open

The change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x72beddf7032eec58f199857b79a8e37020c14e42Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

MXNB: questions

Is MXNB audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for MXNB, dated 15 May 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“MXNB Audit 2024”).

Who audited MXNB?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for MXNB.

Are there open findings in MXNB’s audits?

3 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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