MXNB has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 15 May 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
3 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 low (all open).
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MXNB Audit 2024 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | None open | Findings: 1 high · 2 low 3 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the rescuer address.  In the contract `Rescuable` the role `_rescuer` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_rescuer` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer tokens in this contract to any address.  ----- In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the blacklister address.  In the contract `Blacklistable` the role `blacklister` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `blacklister` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add an account to the blacklist and remove the account from the blacklist.  ----- In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the master minter address.  In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `masterMinter` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `masterMinter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add or update a new minter with a mint allowance and remove a minter.  In the contract `FiatTokenV1` the role `minters` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `minters` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint fiat tokens to an address and allow minters to burn their own tokens.  ----- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and allow the current owner to transfer control of the contract to a new owner.  ----- In the contract `Pausable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the pauser address.  In the contract `Pausable` the role `pauser` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `pauser` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract. 
Open the reportThe `initialize()` function is not called by another contract atomically after the contract is deployed, so it's possible for a malicious user to call `initialize()` which, if it's noticed in time, would require the project to re-deploy the contract in order to properly initialize. The functions `initializeV2()`, `initializeV2_1()` and `initializeV2_2()` have the same issue.
Open the reportThe change of `_owner` by function `transferOwnership()` overrides the previously set `_owner` with the new one without guaranteeing the new `_owner` is able to actuate transactions on-chain.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x72be…4e420x72beddf7032eec58f199857b79a8e37020c14e42 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for MXNB, dated 15 May 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“MXNB Audit 2024”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for MXNB.
3 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 2 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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