0xb25432e551d10025e00285141b3b6c3845f2a34f
As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xb25432e551d10025e00285141b3b6c3845f2a34f on Polygon (POS) as a contract of Futster. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 28 Oct 2022. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.
Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Polygon (POS).
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Commit named in the report | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Futster Token - Audit | CertiK | Not recorded (see the report) | Open |
1 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.
In the contract `FutToken`, fund addresses, for example, `funds[PRIVATE_SALE].fundAddress` can update its address via function `setPrivateSaleAddress()`, and the function would trigger transfer function to transfer the fund address's tokens to the new address. Same for the following functions: - `setPublicSaleAddress()`: update `funds[PUBLIC_SALE].fundAddress` - `setStakingRewardsAddress()`: update `funds[STAKING_REWARDS].fundAddress` - `setGamingIssuanceAddress()`: update `funds[GAMING_ISSUANCE].fundAddress` - `setSoccerClubsAddress()`: update `funds[SOCCER_CLUBS].fundAddress` - `setFutsterTeamAddress()`: update `funds[FUTSTER_TEAM].fundAddress` - `setPreLaunchFundAddress()`: update `funds[PRE_LAUNCH_FUND].fundAddress` - `setAdvisorsAddress()`: update `funds[ADVISORS].fundAddress` Any compromise to the fund addresses may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the addresses and transfer tokens out.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportCurrent `FUTToken` implementation is vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value. Exploit scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
The audit on Trustblock · Open the reportThe Futster security record · Every Futster address · This address on the explorer