Futster contract 0xf99a…f93f on Polygon (POS)

0xf99afeae616316d73ba920f0b96cc849d1b2f93f

As of 21 Nov 2026, Trustblock’s record holds 0xf99afeae616316d73ba920f0b96cc849d1b2f93f on Polygon (POS) as a contract of Futster. 1 audit report on Trustblock lists this address: CertiK, 28 Oct 2022. 3 findings in it are recorded as open or acknowledged.

Audit reports that list this address1

Each report’s scope as stored on Trustblock names this address on Polygon (POS).

AuditSecurity firmDateCommit named in the reportReport
Futster Token - AuditCertiKNot recorded (see the report)Open

Open and acknowledged findings in these reports3

1 High, 2 Low. In the firm’s own words; statuses are the firm’s, from each report.

HighCentralization Related RisksFutster Token - Audit · CertiKOpen

In the contract `FutToken`, fund addresses, for example, `funds[PRIVATE_SALE].fundAddress` can update its address via function `setPrivateSaleAddress()`, and the function would trigger transfer function to transfer the fund address's tokens to the new address. Same for the following functions: - `setPublicSaleAddress()`: update `funds[PUBLIC_SALE].fundAddress` - `setStakingRewardsAddress()`: update `funds[STAKING_REWARDS].fundAddress` - `setGamingIssuanceAddress()`: update `funds[GAMING_ISSUANCE].fundAddress` - `setSoccerClubsAddress()`: update `funds[SOCCER_CLUBS].fundAddress` - `setFutsterTeamAddress()`: update `funds[FUTSTER_TEAM].fundAddress` - `setPreLaunchFundAddress()`: update `funds[PRE_LAUNCH_FUND].fundAddress` - `setAdvisorsAddress()`: update `funds[ADVISORS].fundAddress` Any compromise to the fund addresses may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the addresses and transfer tokens out.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowPotential Risk On `approve()`/`transferFrom()` MeFutster Token - Audit · CertiKOpen

Current `FUTToken` implementation is vulnerable to [a known ERC20 race condition issue](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729), which could lead to token theft. When a user calls `approve()` for a second time on a spender that has already been allowed, the spender could call `transferFrom()` to transfer the previous value and still receive the authorization to transfer the new value. Exploit scenario: 1. Alice calls `approve(Bob, 100)` to allow Bob to spend 100 tokens. 2. Alice changes her mind and calls `approve(Bob, 50)`. 3. Bob observes the second `approve(Bob, 50)` function call and calls `transferFrom(Alice, Bob, 100)` before the second `approve(Bob, 50)` call. 4. The above scenario can be achieved by front-running. In this case, Bob can transfer another 50 tokens from Alice and in total, he transferred 150 tokens from Alice.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report
LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableFutster Token - Audit · CertiKOpen

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

The audit on Trustblock · Open the report

The Futster security record · Every Futster address · This address on the explorer