BlackCardCoin - Audit 2

CertiKCode version: not recorded (see the report)

CertiK reviewed BlackCardCoin (BlackCardCoin - Audit 2) on 27 Jun 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 2 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings4

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low011
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

**In commit 38c0ead5c61997e022d198349cded53028875922:** In the contract `BCCoin` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause token transfers. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-3232-4dccb670-81f3-df456e086f7d/diagrams/centralization_BCCoin-BCCoin-_owner.svg) --- In the contract `Blacklist` the role `blacklistRole` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `blacklistRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove accounts from the blacklist. Accounts in the blacklist cannot transfer or receive BCCoin tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-3232-4dccb670-81f3-df456e086f7d/diagrams/centralization_Blacklist-Blacklist-blacklistRole.svg) In the contract `Blacklist` the role `_owner` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the `blacklistRole`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-3232-4dccb670-81f3-df456e086f7d/diagrams/centralization_Blacklist-Blacklist-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `BCCoinMigration` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer `newToken` out from the contract to the `withdrawAddress`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-3232-4dccb670-81f3-df456e086f7d/diagrams/centralization_BCCoinMigration-BCCoinMigration-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BCCoinMigration` the role `MIGRATE_ROLE` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MIGRATE_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and burn all `legacyToken` from a beneficiary and transfer the same amount of `newToken` to the beneficiary. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-3232-4dccb670-81f3-df456e086f7d/diagrams/centralization_BCCoinMigration-BCCoinMigration-MIGRATE_ROLE.svg) --- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts. --- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - transferOwnership() - renounceOwnership() Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer or renounce the ownership. **In commit b0b83486a7f0a16c4047d2578841b47731e9eaec:** - The `withdrawRemainingNewTokens()` function in the `BCCoinMigration` contract was removed. - The `completeMigration()` function in the `BCCoinMigration` contract was updated, it now burns all `legacyToken` from a beneficiary and transfer the same amount of `newToken` from the `bccLiquidityAddress` to the beneficiary.

HighInitial Token DistributionOpen

All of the BCCoin tokens are sent to the `liquidityAddress` and `rewardAddress` accounts. This is a centralization risk because these accounts can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

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Part of BlackCardCoin’s security record

BlackCardCoin
Audits2 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Jun 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 2 reports.
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