BlackCardCoin has 2 public audit reports from CertiK and Hacken; the latest is CertiK, 27 Jun 2024; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
3 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 low (2 open, 1 acknowledged).
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BlackCardCoin - Audit 2 | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | Findings: 2 high · 2 low 1 fixed · 1 acknowledged · 2 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| BlackCardCoin / BEP20 | Security firm: Hacken | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: None listed | hacken.io ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 1 | 1 |
**In commit 38c0ead5c61997e022d198349cded53028875922:** In the contract `BCCoin` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause token transfers.  --- In the contract `Blacklist` the role `blacklistRole` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `blacklistRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove accounts from the blacklist. Accounts in the blacklist cannot transfer or receive BCCoin tokens.  In the contract `Blacklist` the role `_owner` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the `blacklistRole`.  ----- In the contract `BCCoinMigration` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer `newToken` out from the contract to the `withdrawAddress`.  In the contract `BCCoinMigration` the role `MIGRATE_ROLE` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MIGRATE_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and burn all `legacyToken` from a beneficiary and transfer the same amount of `newToken` to the beneficiary.  --- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts. --- In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions: - transferOwnership() - renounceOwnership() Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer or renounce the ownership. **In commit b0b83486a7f0a16c4047d2578841b47731e9eaec:** - The `withdrawRemainingNewTokens()` function in the `BCCoinMigration` contract was removed. - The `completeMigration()` function in the `BCCoinMigration` contract was updated, it now burns all `legacyToken` from a beneficiary and transfer the same amount of `newToken` from the `bccLiquidityAddress` to the beneficiary.
Open the reportAll of the BCCoin tokens are sent to the `liquidityAddress` and `rewardAddress` accounts. This is a centralization risk because these accounts can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for BlackCardCoin, dated 2 May 2024 to 27 Jun 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“BlackCardCoin - Audit 2”).
2 security firms wrote the reports Trustblock holds for BlackCardCoin: CertiK and Hacken.
3 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 low (2 open, 1 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="blackcardcoin"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us