Wemix Retainer 74 (DIOSV3)

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s retainer series

CertiK reviewed WEMIX (Wemix Retainer 74 (DIOSV3)) on 16 Aug 2024: 10 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 6 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings10

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium101
Low303
MediumUsage of slot0 is Easy to ManipulateFixed

slot0 returns the current tick of the price position of the pool, which can be manipulated easily in the same block if the liquidity in the pool is low or through flash loans. ```solidity=390 (uint160 sqrtPriceX96, int24 tick, , , , , ) = pair.slot0(); ```

LowHardcoded Fee AmountFixed

The smart contract has hardcoded the fee amount as `WEMIX_FEE_AMOUNT = 0.08 ether`. This design choice lacks flexibility and does not allow for dynamic adjustments based on changing network conditions or economic factors. Furthermore, the constant nature of this variable implies that once the smart contract is deployed, this fee cannot be changed. ```solidity=26 // The fixed fee amount specific to WEMIX, set at 0.08 ether. uint256 public constant override WEMIX_FEE_AMOUNT = 0.08 ether; ```

LowMissing Zero Address ValidationFixed

Addresses are not validated before assignment or external calls, potentially allowing the use of zero addresses and leading to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. For example, transferring `operatorManager` to a zero address can result in a permanent loss of access to the privileged functions. ```solidity=66 operatorManager = _newOperatorManager; ``` - `_newOperatorManager` is not zero-checked before being used.

LowUnnecessary call of `_distributeReward()` when reFixed

The function `_distributeReward()` is unconditionally called even when rewardAmount is explicitly set to zero. The scenario under which this occurs is when `wemixDfeeAmount` is greater than the difference between `finalWemixDBalance` and `initialWemixDBalance`. In such a case, the variable rewardAmount is explicitly set to zero, but the function `_distributeReward(rewardAmount)` is still executed. Every unnecessary call to `_distributeReward()` consumes more gas than needed, leading to a financial cost for the callers. ```solidity=212 uint256 rewardAmount; if (wemixDfeeAmount > finalWemixDBalance - initialWemixDBalance) { _transferFee(finalWemixDBalance - initialWemixDBalance, path); rewardAmount = 0; } else { _transferFee(wemixDfeeAmount, path); rewardAmount = finalWemixDBalance - initialWemixDBalance - wemixDfeeAmount; } _distributeReward(rewardAmount); ```

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/DollarInAndOutStabilizer3.sol
  • contracts/extentions/OperatorManagement.sol

Part of WEMIX’s security record

WEMIX
Audits75 audits by 1 firmLast audit Feb 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 75 reports, 17 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open WEMIX’s security record

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CertiK

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