BabyCate - Audit

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed BabyCate (BabyCate - Audit) on 8 Oct 2024: 9 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 5 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen BabyCate’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High011
Medium010
Low033
HighInitial Token DistributionAcknowledged

All of the `BABYCATE` tokens are sent to the contract owner. This is a centralization risk because the owner can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

MediumRouter should not be in the fee exempt whitelistAcknowledged

Some restrictions can be bypassed by swapping tokens to the router and then getting tokens from the router. When the tokens are transferred to the router, the attacker uses the feature of the router function ***`removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens`***, which will send all the specified tokens in the router to a specified address. Because the router is not supposed to receive tokens for any user other than remove liquidity..

LowPotential Sandwich AttacksAcknowledged

A sandwich attack can occur when an attacker notices a transaction involving token swaps or liquidity additions that lacks slippage restrictions or minimum output amount settings. The attacker can exploit this by frontrunning the transaction to purchase one of the assets, thereby manipulating the exchange rate, and then backrunning the transaction to sell the asset for a profit. The referenced functions are invoked without setting slippage restrictions or minimum output amounts, making transactions that trigger these functions particularly vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when large input amounts are involved.

LowRedundant And Unreasonable ApprovalAcknowledged

The allowance is approved to the router based on the token swapping amount in the `swapBack` function. Therefore, approving the maximum allowance to the router is redundant and unnecessary.

LowThird-Party Dependency UsageAcknowledged

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=1011 IUniswapV2Router02 public immutable uniswapV2Router; ``` - The contract `BabyCate` interacts with third party contract with `IUniswapV2Router02` interface via `uniswapV2Router`.

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x76b560b628f74bf192be09f0449abef8e456be79Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of BabyCate’s security record

BabyCate
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Oct 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open BabyCate’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,044 projects reviewed · 1,375 reports · latest May 2025

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