SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed SolChicks NFT (SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1) on 12 Dec 2021: 6 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen SolChicks NFT’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium300
Low200
HighPrivileged Roles and OwnershipOpen

The vesting admin can purge user schedules at will and transfer the vested funds to arbitrary accounts. Similarly, the admin can change the destination (beneficiary) of the vesting accounts.

Medium`destination_address` can have a different mint than the `vesting_token_account`'s mintOpen

The program does not check if the input destination has the same mint as the vesting_token_account. This can lead to denial of service when mints of the destination account does not match the mint of the vesting account.

MediumReliance on untracked-disjoint token accounts for user accountsOpen

The program expects token account addresses of users as inputs. Some users may not have a token account (of the corresponding mint). In such cases corresponding token accounts must be created prior to the trigger of the vesting program. It will be a daunting task (security-wise) to track if the frontend correctly calculates and passes untampered user token accounts to the vesting program.

MediumSpecification inconsistencies in `VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination`Open

Inlined comments indicate that `change_destination` may only be called by the current `destination_address` `program/src/instruction.rs:113~123` > can only be invoked by the present destination address of the contract However, the `change_destination` function does not check if the destination address signed the transaction: `program/src/instruction.rs:374~379` ```rust let data = VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination { seeds }.pack(); let accounts = vec![ AccountMeta::new(*vesting_account_key, false), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*vesting_admin, true), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*target_destination_token_account, false), ]; ``` `program/src/processor.rs:415~419` ```rust pub fn process_change_destination( program_id: &Pubkey, accounts: &[AccountInfo], seeds: [u8; 32], ) -> ProgramResult { ... if !vesting_admin.is_signer { msg!("Vesting admin should be a signer."); return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); } ... ``` The implementation rather assumes that `vesting_admin` changes destinations. This potentially enables the admin to change all destination to, for instance, their accounts.

LowIncorrect `seed` can lead to denial of serviceOpen

Program Derived Accounts (PDA) cannot be on the ed25519 curve. If the combination of the seed and program id result in invalid address, the program will crash with `PubkeyError::InvalidSeeds`.

LowInteger overflow/undeflowOpen

The `create`, `unlock` and `purge` functions use unsafe addition: ``` offset += SCHEDULE_SIZE; ``` ``` total_amount_to_transfer += s.amount; ``` Since rust does not crash in release-mode upon overflows, overflows in the `unlock` function can result in users' vested tokens getting lost (locked in the account indefinitely).

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (1)

  • cxxShYRVcepDudXhe7U62QHvw8uBJoKFifmzggGKVC2

Part of SolChicks NFT’s security record

SolChicks NFT
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Dec 2021, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open SolChicks NFT’s security record

Security firm

Quantstamp

240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026

See Quantstamp’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us