Quantstamp reviewed SolChicks NFT (SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1) on 12 Dec 2021: 6 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 0 |
The vesting admin can purge user schedules at will and transfer the vested funds to arbitrary accounts. Similarly, the admin can change the destination (beneficiary) of the vesting accounts.
The program does not check if the input destination has the same mint as the vesting_token_account. This can lead to denial of service when mints of the destination account does not match the mint of the vesting account.
The program expects token account addresses of users as inputs. Some users may not have a token account (of the corresponding mint). In such cases corresponding token accounts must be created prior to the trigger of the vesting program. It will be a daunting task (security-wise) to track if the frontend correctly calculates and passes untampered user token accounts to the vesting program.
Inlined comments indicate that `change_destination` may only be called by the current `destination_address` `program/src/instruction.rs:113~123` > can only be invoked by the present destination address of the contract However, the `change_destination` function does not check if the destination address signed the transaction: `program/src/instruction.rs:374~379` ```rust let data = VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination { seeds }.pack(); let accounts = vec![ AccountMeta::new(*vesting_account_key, false), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*vesting_admin, true), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*target_destination_token_account, false), ]; ``` `program/src/processor.rs:415~419` ```rust pub fn process_change_destination( program_id: &Pubkey, accounts: &[AccountInfo], seeds: [u8; 32], ) -> ProgramResult { ... if !vesting_admin.is_signer { msg!("Vesting admin should be a signer."); return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); } ... ``` The implementation rather assumes that `vesting_admin` changes destinations. This potentially enables the admin to change all destination to, for instance, their accounts.
Program Derived Accounts (PDA) cannot be on the ed25519 curve. If the combination of the seed and program id result in invalid address, the program will crash with `PubkeyError::InvalidSeeds`.
The `create`, `unlock` and `purge` functions use unsafe addition: ``` offset += SCHEDULE_SIZE; ``` ``` total_amount_to_transfer += s.amount; ``` Since rust does not crash in release-mode upon overflows, overflows in the `unlock` function can result in users' vested tokens getting lost (locked in the account indefinitely).
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