SolChicks NFT audit reports

BNB Chain, Solanasolchicks.io

SolChicks NFT has 1 public audit report from Quantstamp; dated 12 Dec 2021; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm6

Statuses are the security firms’ own

6 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 3 medium, 2 low (all open).

High
1
Medium
3
Low
2
  • High Open

    Privileged Roles and Ownership

    SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    `destination_address` can have a different mint than the `vesting_token_account`'s mint

    SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Reliance on untracked-disjoint token accounts for user accounts

    SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Specification inconsistencies in `VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination`

    SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incorrect `seed` can lead to denial of service

    SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Integer overflow/undeflow

    SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1Security firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 1 high · 3 medium · 2 low
6 open
certificate.quantstamp.com ↗

Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium300
Low200
HighPrivileged Roles and OwnershipSolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021Open

The vesting admin can purge user schedules at will and transfer the vested funds to arbitrary accounts. Similarly, the admin can change the destination (beneficiary) of the vesting accounts.

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Medium`destination_address` can have a different mint than the `vesting_token_account`'s mintSolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021Open

The program does not check if the input destination has the same mint as the vesting_token_account. This can lead to denial of service when mints of the destination account does not match the mint of the vesting account.

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MediumReliance on untracked-disjoint token accounts for user accountsSolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021Open

The program expects token account addresses of users as inputs. Some users may not have a token account (of the corresponding mint). In such cases corresponding token accounts must be created prior to the trigger of the vesting program. It will be a daunting task (security-wise) to track if the frontend correctly calculates and passes untampered user token accounts to the vesting program.

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MediumSpecification inconsistencies in `VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination`SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021Open

Inlined comments indicate that `change_destination` may only be called by the current `destination_address` `program/src/instruction.rs:113~123` > can only be invoked by the present destination address of the contract However, the `change_destination` function does not check if the destination address signed the transaction: `program/src/instruction.rs:374~379` ```rust let data = VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination { seeds }.pack(); let accounts = vec![ AccountMeta::new(*vesting_account_key, false), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*vesting_admin, true), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*target_destination_token_account, false), ]; ``` `program/src/processor.rs:415~419` ```rust pub fn process_change_destination( program_id: &Pubkey, accounts: &[AccountInfo], seeds: [u8; 32], ) -> ProgramResult { ... if !vesting_admin.is_signer { msg!("Vesting admin should be a signer."); return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); } ... ``` The implementation rather assumes that `vesting_admin` changes destinations. This potentially enables the admin to change all destination to, for instance, their accounts.

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LowIncorrect `seed` can lead to denial of serviceSolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021Open

Program Derived Accounts (PDA) cannot be on the ed25519 curve. If the combination of the seed and program id result in invalid address, the program will crash with `PubkeyError::InvalidSeeds`.

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LowInteger overflow/undeflowSolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021Open

The `create`, `unlock` and `purge` functions use unsafe addition: ``` offset += SCHEDULE_SIZE; ``` ``` total_amount_to_transfer += s.amount; ``` Since rust does not crash in release-mode upon overflows, overflows in the `unlock` function can result in users' vested tokens getting lost (locked in the account indefinitely).

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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SolChicks NFT: questions

Is SolChicks NFT audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for SolChicks NFT, dated 12 Dec 2021. The latest is by Quantstamp (“SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1”).

Who audited SolChicks NFT?

Quantstamp wrote the report Trustblock holds for SolChicks NFT.

Are there open findings in SolChicks NFT’s audits?

6 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 3 medium, 2 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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