SolChicks NFT has 1 public audit report from Quantstamp; dated 12 Dec 2021; no critical findings reported.
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Statuses are the security firms’ own
6 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 3 medium, 2 low (all open).
Privileged Roles and Ownership
SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗
`destination_address` can have a different mint than the `vesting_token_account`'s mint
SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗
Reliance on untracked-disjoint token accounts for user accounts
SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗
Specification inconsistencies in `VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination`
SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗
Incorrect `seed` can lead to denial of service
SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗
Integer overflow/undeflow
SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 · Quantstamp · 12 Dec 2021 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1 | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 1 high · 3 medium · 2 low 6 open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 0 |
The vesting admin can purge user schedules at will and transfer the vested funds to arbitrary accounts. Similarly, the admin can change the destination (beneficiary) of the vesting accounts.
Open the reportThe program does not check if the input destination has the same mint as the vesting_token_account. This can lead to denial of service when mints of the destination account does not match the mint of the vesting account.
Open the reportThe program expects token account addresses of users as inputs. Some users may not have a token account (of the corresponding mint). In such cases corresponding token accounts must be created prior to the trigger of the vesting program. It will be a daunting task (security-wise) to track if the frontend correctly calculates and passes untampered user token accounts to the vesting program.
Open the reportInlined comments indicate that `change_destination` may only be called by the current `destination_address` `program/src/instruction.rs:113~123` > can only be invoked by the present destination address of the contract However, the `change_destination` function does not check if the destination address signed the transaction: `program/src/instruction.rs:374~379` ```rust let data = VestingInstruction::ChangeDestination { seeds }.pack(); let accounts = vec![ AccountMeta::new(*vesting_account_key, false), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*vesting_admin, true), AccountMeta::new_readonly(*target_destination_token_account, false), ]; ``` `program/src/processor.rs:415~419` ```rust pub fn process_change_destination( program_id: &Pubkey, accounts: &[AccountInfo], seeds: [u8; 32], ) -> ProgramResult { ... if !vesting_admin.is_signer { msg!("Vesting admin should be a signer."); return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature); } ... ``` The implementation rather assumes that `vesting_admin` changes destinations. This potentially enables the admin to change all destination to, for instance, their accounts.
Open the reportProgram Derived Accounts (PDA) cannot be on the ed25519 curve. If the combination of the seed and program id result in invalid address, the program will crash with `PubkeyError::InvalidSeeds`.
Open the reportThe `create`, `unlock` and `purge` functions use unsafe addition: ``` offset += SCHEDULE_SIZE; ``` ``` total_amount_to_transfer += s.amount; ``` Since rust does not crash in release-mode upon overflows, overflows in the `unlock` function can result in users' vested tokens getting lost (locked in the account indefinitely).
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for SolChicks NFT, dated 12 Dec 2021. The latest is by Quantstamp (“SolChicks Token Vesting Program - Copy 1”).
Quantstamp wrote the report Trustblock holds for SolChicks NFT.
6 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 3 medium, 2 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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