BlastUP - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed BlastUP (BlastUP - Audit) on 29 Feb 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 4 open.

No open critical findings
Open BlastUP’s security record

The original report was removed from its address (seen 15 Oct 2026).

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Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium002
Low301
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contracts `Presale` and `PresaleBSC` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list and diagram below. * `updateProtocolWallet(address wallet)` - Allows the owner to update the address of the `protocolWallet`. * `setStage(uint256 stageIterator_)` - Enables the owner to set the presale stage. It will allow the owner to change presale stage to a later stage which require higher costs. * `updateTotalSold(uint256 amount)` - Permits the owner to manually adjust the total tokens sold. * `pause()` - Pause the contract, stopping most of its operations. * `unpause()` - Unpause the contract, resuming its operations. * `rescueFunds(IERC20 token, uint256 amount)` - Allows the owner to withdraw specified ERC20 tokens or native coins from the contract. The `Presale` and `PresaleBSC` contract also inherit `Ownable` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `_owner` also has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `renounceOwnership()` - Renounce the ownership of contract to leave the contract without an owner. * `transferOwnership()` - Transfers ownership of the contract to a new account. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change some important state variables, and even withdraw all assets in the contract through the `rescueFunds()` function and manage the ownership of contracts. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d129-0845a3b0-91b3-97a9d9e6d241/diagrams/centralization_Presale-Presale-_owner.svg)

LowChainlink aggregators return the incorrect priceOpen

The function `_calculateAmount` calls `latestRoundData()` from Chainlink to acquire the token's price. Chainlink aggregators have a built in circuit breaker if the price of an asset goes outside of a predetermined price band. The result is that if an asset experiences a huge drop in value (i.e. LUNA crash) the price of the oracle will continue to return the `minAnswer` instead of the actual price of the asset. See [Chainlink's docs](https://docs.chain.link/data-feeds#check-the-latest-answer-against-reasonable-limits) for more info. Chainlink's `latestRoundData` pulls the associated aggregator and requests round data from it. ChainlinkAggregators have `minAnswer` and `maxAnswer` circuit breakers built into them. This means that if the price of the asset drops below the `minAnswer`, the protocol will continue to value the token at `minAnswer` instead of it's actual value. This will allow users to exploit certain parts of the protocol. This discreprency could cause major issues within the protocol and potentially lead to loss of funds. This is exactly what happened to [Venus on BSC when LUNA imploded](https://rekt.news/venus-blizz-rekt/).

LowMissing Emit EventsOpen

Functions that update state variables should emit relevant events as notifications. Especially in the `setStage()` function, there is a corresponding event in the contract that can be emitted, but it has not been used.

LowMissing Zero Address ValidationOpen

The `to` address input in these functions are missing a check that it is not `address(0)`.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/Presale.sol
  • contracts/PresaleBSC.sol

Part of BlastUP’s security record

BlastUP
Audits3 audits by 2 firmsLast audit May 2024, by Hacken.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 3 reports.
Open BlastUP’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

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