BlastUP audit reports

Base, BNB Chain, Ethereum, Polygon (POS)blastup.ioX

BlastUP has 3 public audit reports from CertiK and Hacken; the latest is Hacken, 15 May 2024; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm15

Statuses are the security firms’ own

15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 11 low (all open).

High
3
Medium
1
Low
11
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    BlastUP - Addendum · CertiK · 21 Mar 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    BlastUP - Addendum · CertiK · 21 Mar 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    BlastUP - Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Signature Replay In Tier Registration

    BlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    `decimals()` is not a part of the `ERC-20` standard

    BlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Centralization Risk For Privileged Actors

    BlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Fee-On-Transfer Token Handling Flaw

    BlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Inconsistent Validation Checks Across Token Setting Functions

    BlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Lack of Boundary Checks

    BlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Validation of Tier Hierarchy

    BlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024 · Report ↗

All 15 open and acknowledged findings

Audits3

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
BlastUp / LaunchpadSecurity firm: HackenDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 2 medium · 9 low
3 fixed · 8 open
hacken.io ↗
BlastUP - AddendumSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 2 high · 5 low
4 fixed · 3 open
Original removed
BlastUP - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 1 high · 2 medium · 4 low
3 fixed · 4 open
Original removed

Findings34

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High300
Medium103
Low1107
HighCentralization Related RisksBlastUP - Addendum · CertiK · 21 Mar 2024Open

In the contract `PresaleBlast`, the `OPERATOR_ROLE` role has the authority to toggle the contract's pause state. This action can impact the regular operation of the subsequent functions: - `depositUSDBTo()` - `depositUSDB()` - `depositWETHTo()` - `depositWETH()` The pause state also impacts the following functions in the `Presale` contract: - `depositUSDCTo()` - `depositUSDC()` - `depositUSDTTo()` - `depositUSDT()` - `depositCoinTo()` - `depositCoin()` Moreover, the `OPERATOR_ROLE` and `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` roles are established within the `Presale` contract and assigned to the address `operator` and the address `DAO`, respectively. The role `OPERATOR_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * `setStage(uint256 stageIterator_)` - Enables the operator to set the presale stage. It will allow the operator to change presale stage to a later stage which requires higher costs. * `updateTotalSold(uint256 amount)` - Permits the operator to manually adjust the total tokens sold. * `pause()` - Pause the contract, stopping most of its operations. * `unpause()` - Unpause the contract, resuming its operations. The role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * `updateProtocolWallet(address wallet)` - Allows the admin to update the address of the `protocolWallet`. * `rescueFunds(IERC20 token, uint256 amount)` - Allows the admin to withdraw specified ERC20 tokens or native coins from the contract. The `Presale` contract also inherit `AccessControl` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` alse has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `grantRole(bytes32 role, address account)` - Grants `role` to `account`. * `revokeRole(bytes32 role, address account)` - Revokes `role` from `account`. Any compromise to the `OPERATOR_ROLE` account or `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change some important state variables, and even withdraw all assets in the contract through the `rescueFunds()` function and manage the ownership of contracts.

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HighInitial Token DistributionBlastUP - Addendum · CertiK · 21 Mar 2024Open

All of the `BLP` tokens are sent to the address `daoAddress`. This is a centralization risk because the address `daoAddress` can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to this address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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HighCentralization Related RisksBlastUP - Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024Open

In the contracts `Presale` and `PresaleBSC` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the list and diagram below. * `updateProtocolWallet(address wallet)` - Allows the owner to update the address of the `protocolWallet`. * `setStage(uint256 stageIterator_)` - Enables the owner to set the presale stage. It will allow the owner to change presale stage to a later stage which require higher costs. * `updateTotalSold(uint256 amount)` - Permits the owner to manually adjust the total tokens sold. * `pause()` - Pause the contract, stopping most of its operations. * `unpause()` - Unpause the contract, resuming its operations. * `rescueFunds(IERC20 token, uint256 amount)` - Allows the owner to withdraw specified ERC20 tokens or native coins from the contract. The `Presale` and `PresaleBSC` contract also inherit `Ownable` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `_owner` also has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `renounceOwnership()` - Renounce the ownership of contract to leave the contract without an owner. * `transferOwnership()` - Transfers ownership of the contract to a new account. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change some important state variables, and even withdraw all assets in the contract through the `rescueFunds()` function and manage the ownership of contracts. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d129-0845a3b0-91b3-97a9d9e6d241/diagrams/centralization_Presale-Presale-_owner.svg)

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MediumSignature Replay In Tier RegistrationBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

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Low`decimals()` is not a part of the `ERC-20` standardBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowCentralization Risk For Privileged ActorsBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
LowFee-On-Transfer Token Handling FlawBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

Open the report
LowInconsistent Validation Checks Across Token Setting FunctionsBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowLack of Boundary ChecksBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowMissing Validation of Tier HierarchyBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

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Show 5 more
LowPrivileged Functions Susceptible to Front-RunningBlastUp / Launchpad · Hacken · 15 May 2024Open

The report gives no description here.

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LowPurpose of Project DesignBlastUP - Addendum · CertiK · 21 Mar 2024Open

The audit team would like to confirm the project design: ## Centralized Functions with Timelock Mechanism The presale contracts include several centralized functions that can only be executed by accounts with the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or `OPERATOR_ROLE` roles. Some functions use a timelock mechanism. There is a defect in the current mechanism: the wait time for these functions to execute is set by updating `_timestamps[selector]` only on the first invocation of the function. However, after the function's logic has actually been executed, the value of `_timestamps[selector]` does not change, allowing subsequent executions to proceed immediately without waiting. For example, in the `updateProtocolWallet` function: ```solidity //NOTE function selector is: 0xe308a099 function updateProtocolWallet(address wallet) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) { uint256 delayedTill = _timestamps[0xe308a099]; if(delayedTill > 0 && delayedTill <= block.timestamp) { protocolWallet = wallet; } else { _timestamps[0xe308a099] = block.timestamp + DEFAULT_DELAY; } } ``` The timestamp is set upon the first call, but if the condition `delayedTill > 0 && delayedTill <= block.timestamp` is true, the function executes and updates the `protocolWallet`, but it does not reset the `_timestamps[0xe308a099]`. This means that after the initial delay, the function can be called again without waiting for the `DEFAULT_DELAY`, defeating the purpose of the timelock. ## Purpose of `updateTotalSold` function The `updateTotalSold` function is utilized to revise the `totalTokensSold` tally during the presale phase. The audit team would like to understand the purpose of this particular metric, as opposed to the actual value of sales.

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LowChainlink aggregators return the incorrect priceBlastUP - Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024Open

The function `_calculateAmount` calls `latestRoundData()` from Chainlink to acquire the token's price. Chainlink aggregators have a built in circuit breaker if the price of an asset goes outside of a predetermined price band. The result is that if an asset experiences a huge drop in value (i.e. LUNA crash) the price of the oracle will continue to return the `minAnswer` instead of the actual price of the asset. See [Chainlink's docs](https://docs.chain.link/data-feeds#check-the-latest-answer-against-reasonable-limits) for more info. Chainlink's `latestRoundData` pulls the associated aggregator and requests round data from it. ChainlinkAggregators have `minAnswer` and `maxAnswer` circuit breakers built into them. This means that if the price of the asset drops below the `minAnswer`, the protocol will continue to value the token at `minAnswer` instead of it's actual value. This will allow users to exploit certain parts of the protocol. This discreprency could cause major issues within the protocol and potentially lead to loss of funds. This is exactly what happened to [Venus on BSC when LUNA imploded](https://rekt.news/venus-blizz-rekt/).

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LowMissing Emit EventsBlastUP - Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024Open

Functions that update state variables should emit relevant events as notifications. Especially in the `setStage()` function, there is a corresponding event in the contract that can be emitted, but it has not been used.

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LowMissing Zero Address ValidationBlastUP - Audit · CertiK · 29 Feb 2024Open

The `to` address input in these functions are missing a check that it is not `address(0)`.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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The repositories and files the reports name

BlastUP: questions

Is BlastUP audited?

Trustblock holds 3 public audit reports for BlastUP, dated 29 Feb 2024 to 15 May 2024. The latest is by Hacken (“BlastUp / Launchpad”).

Who audited BlastUP?

2 security firms wrote the reports Trustblock holds for BlastUP: CertiK and Hacken.

Are there open findings in BlastUP’s audits?

15 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 1 medium, 11 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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