CertiK reviewed BlastUP (BlastUP - Addendum) on 21 Mar 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 3 open.
The original report was removed from its address (seen 21 Oct 2026).
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 4 |
In the contract `PresaleBlast`, the `OPERATOR_ROLE` role has the authority to toggle the contract's pause state. This action can impact the regular operation of the subsequent functions: - `depositUSDBTo()` - `depositUSDB()` - `depositWETHTo()` - `depositWETH()` The pause state also impacts the following functions in the `Presale` contract: - `depositUSDCTo()` - `depositUSDC()` - `depositUSDTTo()` - `depositUSDT()` - `depositCoinTo()` - `depositCoin()` Moreover, the `OPERATOR_ROLE` and `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` roles are established within the `Presale` contract and assigned to the address `operator` and the address `DAO`, respectively. The role `OPERATOR_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * `setStage(uint256 stageIterator_)` - Enables the operator to set the presale stage. It will allow the operator to change presale stage to a later stage which requires higher costs. * `updateTotalSold(uint256 amount)` - Permits the operator to manually adjust the total tokens sold. * `pause()` - Pause the contract, stopping most of its operations. * `unpause()` - Unpause the contract, resuming its operations. The role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * `updateProtocolWallet(address wallet)` - Allows the admin to update the address of the `protocolWallet`. * `rescueFunds(IERC20 token, uint256 amount)` - Allows the admin to withdraw specified ERC20 tokens or native coins from the contract. The `Presale` contract also inherit `AccessControl` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` alse has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `grantRole(bytes32 role, address account)` - Grants `role` to `account`. * `revokeRole(bytes32 role, address account)` - Revokes `role` from `account`. Any compromise to the `OPERATOR_ROLE` account or `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change some important state variables, and even withdraw all assets in the contract through the `rescueFunds()` function and manage the ownership of contracts.
All of the `BLP` tokens are sent to the address `daoAddress`. This is a centralization risk because the address `daoAddress` can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to this address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
The audit team would like to confirm the project design: ## Centralized Functions with Timelock Mechanism The presale contracts include several centralized functions that can only be executed by accounts with the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or `OPERATOR_ROLE` roles. Some functions use a timelock mechanism. There is a defect in the current mechanism: the wait time for these functions to execute is set by updating `_timestamps[selector]` only on the first invocation of the function. However, after the function's logic has actually been executed, the value of `_timestamps[selector]` does not change, allowing subsequent executions to proceed immediately without waiting. For example, in the `updateProtocolWallet` function: ```solidity //NOTE function selector is: 0xe308a099 function updateProtocolWallet(address wallet) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) { uint256 delayedTill = _timestamps[0xe308a099]; if(delayedTill > 0 && delayedTill <= block.timestamp) { protocolWallet = wallet; } else { _timestamps[0xe308a099] = block.timestamp + DEFAULT_DELAY; } } ``` The timestamp is set upon the first call, but if the condition `delayedTill > 0 && delayedTill <= block.timestamp` is true, the function executes and updates the `protocolWallet`, but it does not reset the `_timestamps[0xe308a099]`. This means that after the initial delay, the function can be called again without waiting for the `DEFAULT_DELAY`, defeating the purpose of the timelock. ## Purpose of `updateTotalSold` function The `updateTotalSold` function is utilized to revise the `totalTokensSold` tally during the presale phase. The audit team would like to understand the purpose of this particular metric, as opposed to the actual value of sales.
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