BlastUP - Addendum

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed BlastUP (BlastUP - Addendum) on 21 Mar 2024: 7 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 3 open.

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The original report was removed from its address (seen 21 Oct 2026).

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Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low104
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `PresaleBlast`, the `OPERATOR_ROLE` role has the authority to toggle the contract's pause state. This action can impact the regular operation of the subsequent functions: - `depositUSDBTo()` - `depositUSDB()` - `depositWETHTo()` - `depositWETH()` The pause state also impacts the following functions in the `Presale` contract: - `depositUSDCTo()` - `depositUSDC()` - `depositUSDTTo()` - `depositUSDT()` - `depositCoinTo()` - `depositCoin()` Moreover, the `OPERATOR_ROLE` and `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` roles are established within the `Presale` contract and assigned to the address `operator` and the address `DAO`, respectively. The role `OPERATOR_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * `setStage(uint256 stageIterator_)` - Enables the operator to set the presale stage. It will allow the operator to change presale stage to a later stage which requires higher costs. * `updateTotalSold(uint256 amount)` - Permits the operator to manually adjust the total tokens sold. * `pause()` - Pause the contract, stopping most of its operations. * `unpause()` - Unpause the contract, resuming its operations. The role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the list below. * `updateProtocolWallet(address wallet)` - Allows the admin to update the address of the `protocolWallet`. * `rescueFunds(IERC20 token, uint256 amount)` - Allows the admin to withdraw specified ERC20 tokens or native coins from the contract. The `Presale` contract also inherit `AccessControl` contract from Openzeppelin, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` alse has authority over the functions from its parent contract list below. * `grantRole(bytes32 role, address account)` - Grants `role` to `account`. * `revokeRole(bytes32 role, address account)` - Revokes `role` from `account`. Any compromise to the `OPERATOR_ROLE` account or `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change some important state variables, and even withdraw all assets in the contract through the `rescueFunds()` function and manage the ownership of contracts.

HighInitial Token DistributionOpen

All of the `BLP` tokens are sent to the address `daoAddress`. This is a centralization risk because the address `daoAddress` can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to this address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

LowPurpose of Project DesignOpen

The audit team would like to confirm the project design: ## Centralized Functions with Timelock Mechanism The presale contracts include several centralized functions that can only be executed by accounts with the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or `OPERATOR_ROLE` roles. Some functions use a timelock mechanism. There is a defect in the current mechanism: the wait time for these functions to execute is set by updating `_timestamps[selector]` only on the first invocation of the function. However, after the function's logic has actually been executed, the value of `_timestamps[selector]` does not change, allowing subsequent executions to proceed immediately without waiting. For example, in the `updateProtocolWallet` function: ```solidity //NOTE function selector is: 0xe308a099 function updateProtocolWallet(address wallet) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) { uint256 delayedTill = _timestamps[0xe308a099]; if(delayedTill > 0 && delayedTill <= block.timestamp) { protocolWallet = wallet; } else { _timestamps[0xe308a099] = block.timestamp + DEFAULT_DELAY; } } ``` The timestamp is set upon the first call, but if the condition `delayedTill > 0 && delayedTill <= block.timestamp` is true, the function executes and updates the `protocolWallet`, but it does not reset the `_timestamps[0xe308a099]`. This means that after the initial delay, the function can be called again without waiting for the `DEFAULT_DELAY`, defeating the purpose of the timelock. ## Purpose of `updateTotalSold` function The `updateTotalSold` function is utilized to revise the `totalTokensSold` tally during the presale phase. The audit team would like to understand the purpose of this particular metric, as opposed to the actual value of sales.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/PresaleBlast.sol
  • contracts/BLPToken.sol

Part of BlastUP’s security record

BlastUP
Audits3 audits by 2 firmsLast audit May 2024, by Hacken.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 3 reports.
Open BlastUP’s security record

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CertiK

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