Quantstamp reviewed Datachain (Datachain - ELC for Bridge (OptimismELC)) on 25 Jul 2025: 4 findings, 0 critical; all marked fixed.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 4 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
The `try_from()` function implemented for `MemoryOracleClient` loops on the `value` vector of preimages. The logic does not validate for duplicate preimages before operating on them, which may result in unwanted or broken behavior.
The `try_from()` function implemented for `MemoryOracleClient` matches the `preimage_key.key_type()` value against the `PreimageKeyType::Keccak256` and `PreimageKeyType::Sha256` keytypes to validate them before including them in the oracle; however, the `_ => {}` arm would allow any other keytype to be included in the oracle without validation.
The `update_client()` function has a `todo!()` for `ClientMessage::Misbehaviour`. Hence, the light client cannot currently process or react to misbehaviour reports.
Currently, when calling `verify_blob_preimage()`, the value of the last 32 bytes of `blob_key` when instantiated at `oracle.rs#L176` can in principle be arbitrary so long as the commitment within the first 48 bytes is correct. Although the function remains safe due to KZG verification, it may cause the client to accept preimages that other clients would reject, resulting in a subtle impact regarding client interoperability.
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