Saffron

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed saffron.finance (Saffron) on 21 Mar 2023: 12 findings, 0 critical; 7 marked fixed, 5 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
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Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low057
LowClone-and-OwnFixed

The clone-and-own approach involves copying and adjusting open source code at one's own discretion. From the development perspective, it is initially beneficial as it reduces the amount of effort. However, from the security perspective, it involves some risks as the code may not follow the best practices, may contain a security vulnerability, or may include intentionally or unintentionally modified upstream libraries. Use Uniswap's `FullMath.sol` instead of `Math.sol` to avoid maintaining the code.

LowMissing Input ValidationFixed

It is crucial to validate inputs, even if the inputs come from trusted addresses, to avoid human error. Following is the list of places that can potentially benefit from a stricter input validation: 1. `VaultFactory.addVaultType()` it is worth checking if that exact `bytecode` already exists. 2. `UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.initialize()` does not validate `params.minTick` to be less than `params.maxTick`. 3. `VaultFactory.sol#154`: the `_adapterInfo.vaultAddress` of the `createVault()` function should be zero address. Otherwise, it is not possible to invoke `initializeVault()` if a vault is already attached to the specified `adapter`. 4. `VaultFactory.sol#162`: the `vaultAddress` of the `createVault()` function should not be zero. The assembly `create` function returns a zero address upon error. 5. `VaultFactory.sol#251`: the `adapterAddress` of the `createAdapter()` function should not be zero. The assembly `create` function returns a zero address upon error.

LowMissing RequirementsFixed

`UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.removeLiquidity()` should require that earning have been settled. Safety checks must be implemented at the smart contract level to prevent future breaking changes. Similarly, `UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.deployCapital()` should require that the token ID is not set in order to safely execute the transaction..

LowOutdated Solidity VersionFixed

As security standards develop, so does the Solidity language. To stay up to date with current practices, it's important to use a recent version of Solidity and recent conventions.

LowProvide Liquidity Lower than `fixedSideCapacity `Fixed

Within the `deployCapital()` function implementation, the `uint256 fixedSideCapacity` gets cast to `uint128` from `uint256`. Therefore, if `fixedSideCapacity` exceeds `uint128`, `fixedSideCapacity` will be truncated during the conversion. This is problematic because this allows a depositor to deposit less than expected liquidity. The current implementation has a check inside `setVault()`, but it is a good practice to add the check in the `deployCapital()` function in case of code restructuring.

LowUnclear Variable NamingFixed

Local variable naming in `UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.mintToken()` is confusing: ``` (..., uint256 minted0, uint256 minted1) = positionManager.mint(params); ``` `minted0` and `minted1` do not represent minted amounts but the amount used as liquidity for the Uniswap pool.

LowUnlocked PragmaFixed

Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format `pragma solidity (^)0.8.*`. The caret (`^`) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version _and above_, hence the term "unlocked".

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (22)

  • contracts/interfaces/IAdapter.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/Tick.sol
  • contracts/RestrictedVaultFactory_checked.sol
  • contracts/Vault.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/interfaces/INonfungibleTokenPositionDescriptor.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/TickMath.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/interfaces/INonfungiblePositionManager.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/LiquidityAmounts.sol
  • contracts/adapters/AdapterBase.sol
  • contracts/adapters/UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/PoolAddress.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IVault.sol
  • contracts/UniV3Vault.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/SafeCast.sol
  • contracts/VaultFactory.sol
  • contracts/Math_checked.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/FullMath.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/PositionKey.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/PositionValue.sol
  • contracts/VaultBearerToken_checked.sol
  • contracts/adapters/UniV3FullRangeAdapter.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/ChainId.sol

Part of saffron.finance’s security record

saffron.finance
Audits3 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Dec 2025, by ChainSecurity.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 3 reports.
Open saffron.finance’s security record

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Quantstamp

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