CertiK reviewed Sigma Protocol (Ignight Technologies) on 21 Sep 2022: 32 findings, 0 critical; 11 marked fixed, 9 acknowledged, 12 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
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Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 8 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Low | 12 | 0 | 8 |
In the `unstake()` function, all the user's `vxSIG` token will be burnt no matter how many `xSIG` is unstaked. Is that an intended design?
The available votes of a user is based on the user's balance of the `vxSIG` token. Is there a possibility that the user Bob transfer all his balance of `vxSIG` token to Alice after Bob voted a pool? Then Alice votes to the same pool. What if the `Bob` account and the `Alice` account are actually the same user?
When transferring standard ERC20 deflationary tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user stakes 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee) in a MasterChef, only 90 tokens actually arrived in the contract. However, the user can still withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. These contracts take the pool token balance(or staked/deposited token balance) into account when calculating the users' reward. An attacker can repeat the process of deposit and withdraw to lower the token balance in a deflationary token pool and cause the contract to increase the reward amount. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f
In the `addAllVotings()`, the left over ticks/weight will be sent to the last pool, is that an intended design?
There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e) for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ The given input is missing the check for the non-zero address.
The function `addPool()` of contract `LpFarmV1` does not check whether the passed-in `_lpToken` exists or whether `_lpToken` is the reward token `SIG`. If the owner adds the same LP token mistakenly, the rewards will be messed up.
The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e). for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ In the function `forwardLpTokensFromLockdrop()` of the contract `LpFarmV1`, each call to this function will reset the corresponding `user.lockdropAmount` to the passed-in value `_amount`. And the `user.lockdropAmount` is checked and determines a user's withdrawable LP tokens when a user wants to withdraw LP tokens by calling `withdrawLockdropLPTokens()`. As a result, this linked statement may cause a user can not withdraw LP tokens or gain fewer LP tokens than deserved. We know the call to `forwardLpTokensFromLockdrop` is limited by the function `forwardLpTokenToLpFarm()` of the contract `LockdropLpFarmProxyV1`, however, the `lockdropProxy` is managed by the owner role and the risk still exists.
These contracts - `KlayswapEscrowV1` - `LpFarmV1` - `SigFarmV1` - `SigKSPFarmV1` - `SigKSPStakingV1` - `SigmaVoterV1` - `xSigFarmV1` are serving as the underlying entities to interact with many third-party protocols: - `IVotingKSP` - `IPoolVoting` - `IFactory` - `IFeeDistributor` - `IxSIGToken` - `IWhitelist` - `IvxERC20` - `IERC20Upgradeable` - `ISigmaVoter` - `ISigKSPFarm` - `ILpFarm` The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of 3rd parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of 3rd parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.
The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e) for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ We understand that the `lockdropProxy` is required to implement the feature of the protocol, however, its implementation is out of the scope for this audit, and needed to be monitored by the engineer to ensure it is implemented as intended.
The imported source files in the contracts `KlayswapEscrowV1`, `LpFarmV1`, `SigFarmV1`, `SigKSPFarmV1`, `SigKSPStakingV1`, `SigmaVoterV1`, and `xSigFarmV1` are unknown.
The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e) for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ The value of the parameter passed to the `WithdrawLockdropLP` event in the `withdrawLockdropLPTokens()` function is zero, which is wrong.
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Repository and files the report names (7)
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