Sigma Protocol audit reports

Sigma Protocol has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 21 Sep 2022; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm21

Statuses are the security firms’ own

21 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 8 high, 1 medium, 12 low (12 open, 9 acknowledged).

High
8
Medium
1
Low
12
  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in KlayswapEscrowV1.sol

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in LpFarmV1.sol

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in SigFarmV1.sol

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in SigKSPFarmV1.sol

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in SigKSPStakingV1.sol

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in SigmaVoterV1.sol

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Risks in xSigFarmV1.sol

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • Medium Acknowledged

    Potential Incorrect Data For Top Votes

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    All of the `vxSIG` balance of the user are burnt

    Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022 · Report ↗

All 21 open and acknowledged findings

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Ignight TechnologiesSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 10 high · 2 medium · 20 low
11 fixed · 9 acknowledged · 12 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings32

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High082
Medium011
Low1208
LowAll of the `vxSIG` balance of the user are burntIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

In the `unstake()` function, all the user's `vxSIG` token will be burnt no matter how many `xSIG` is unstaked. Is that an intended design?

Open the report
LowAvailable VotesIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

The available votes of a user is based on the user's balance of the `vxSIG` token. Is there a possibility that the user Bob transfer all his balance of `vxSIG` token to Alice after Bob voted a pool? Then Alice votes to the same pool. What if the `Bob` account and the `Alice` account are actually the same user?

Open the report
LowIncompatibility With Deflationary Tokens(Farming)Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

When transferring standard ERC20 deflationary tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user stakes 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee) in a MasterChef, only 90 tokens actually arrived in the contract. However, the user can still withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. These contracts take the pool token balance(or staked/deposited token balance) into account when calculating the users' reward. An attacker can repeat the process of deposit and withdraw to lower the token balance in a deflationary token pool and cause the contract to increase the reward amount. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f

Open the report
LowLeft over votes are sent to the last poolIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

In the `addAllVotings()`, the left over ticks/weight will be sent to the last pool, is that an intended design?

Open the report
LowMissing Emit EventsIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

Open the report
LowMissing Input ValidationIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e) for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ The given input is missing the check for the non-zero address.

Open the report
LowMissing Input Validation For `_lpToken`Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

The function `addPool()` of contract `LpFarmV1` does not check whether the passed-in `_lpToken` exists or whether `_lpToken` is the reward token `SIG`. If the owner adds the same LP token mistakenly, the rewards will be messed up.

Open the report
LowPotential Error Calculation for `user.lockdropAmoIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e). for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ In the function `forwardLpTokensFromLockdrop()` of the contract `LpFarmV1`, each call to this function will reset the corresponding `user.lockdropAmount` to the passed-in value `_amount`. And the `user.lockdropAmount` is checked and determines a user's withdrawable LP tokens when a user wants to withdraw LP tokens by calling `withdrawLockdropLPTokens()`. As a result, this linked statement may cause a user can not withdraw LP tokens or gain fewer LP tokens than deserved. We know the call to `forwardLpTokensFromLockdrop` is limited by the function `forwardLpTokenToLpFarm()` of the contract `LockdropLpFarmProxyV1`, however, the `lockdropProxy` is managed by the owner role and the risk still exists.

Open the report
LowThird Party DependenciesIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

These contracts - `KlayswapEscrowV1` - `LpFarmV1` - `SigFarmV1` - `SigKSPFarmV1` - `SigKSPStakingV1` - `SigmaVoterV1` - `xSigFarmV1` are serving as the underlying entities to interact with many third-party protocols: - `IVotingKSP` - `IPoolVoting` - `IFactory` - `IFeeDistributor` - `IxSIGToken` - `IWhitelist` - `IvxERC20` - `IERC20Upgradeable` - `ISigmaVoter` - `ISigKSPFarm` - `ILpFarm` The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of 3rd parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of 3rd parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.

Open the report
LowUnknown Implementation of the `lockdropProxy`Ignight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e) for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ We understand that the `lockdropProxy` is required to implement the feature of the protocol, however, its implementation is out of the scope for this audit, and needed to be monitored by the engineer to ensure it is implemented as intended.

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Show 2 more
LowUnknown Imported Source FileIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

The imported source files in the contracts `KlayswapEscrowV1`, `LpFarmV1`, `SigFarmV1`, `SigKSPFarmV1`, `SigKSPStakingV1`, `SigmaVoterV1`, and `xSigFarmV1` are unknown.

Open the report
LowWrong Value in the EventIgnight Technologies · CertiK · 21 Sep 2022Open

The finding is proposed based on the commit [086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e](https://github.com/Sigma-Klaytn/sigma-core/tree/086b8b46304d0f7abe69de9130ace21400332d0e) for the `LpFarmV1` contract.\ The value of the parameter passed to the `WithdrawLockdropLP` event in the `withdrawLockdropLPTokens()` function is zero, which is wrong.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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The repositories and files the reports name

Sigma Protocol: questions

Is Sigma Protocol audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Sigma Protocol, dated 21 Sep 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“Ignight Technologies”).

Who audited Sigma Protocol?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Sigma Protocol.

Are there open findings in Sigma Protocol’s audits?

21 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 8 high, 1 medium, 12 low (12 open, 9 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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