Part of CertiK’s series
CertiK reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Private Conversions) on 27 Nov 2023: 12 findings, 0 critical; 9 marked fixed, 3 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 8 |
Note that any centralization risks present in the existing codebase before this PR was not considered in this audit and only those added in this PR are addressed in the audit. We recommend all users to carefully review the centralization risks, much of which can be found in our previous audit *VENUS - TOKEN CONVERTER*, which can be found here: [https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus](https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus). --- In the contract `AbstractTokenConverter` the role `_owner` was given authority over the functions: - `setConverterNetwork()` - `setConversionConfig()` Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Change the converter network to a malicious contract to be able to convert tokens when only converters should be allowed to or to cause private conversions to fail. - Set or update conversion configurations and who is allowed to do the conversions. --- In the contract `ConverterNetwork` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` of the `AccessControlManager` can grant addresses the privilege to call the following functions: - `addTokenConverter()` - `removeTokenConverter()` Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or accounts granted this privilege may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and add or remove token converters from the network. This can be used to either allow add a malicious converter or to exclude converters to prevent private conversions.
The contract `ConverterNetwork` is upgradeable; the corresponding `admin` role in each respective proxy has the authority to update the implementation contract behind each contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account in each proxy may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract the proxy points to, and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract. Note that other contracts in scope are also upgradeable, but this functionality was not added in the PR which is in scope of this audit. For more details see our previous audit *VENUS - TOKEN CONVERTER*, which can be found here: [https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus](https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus).
We would like further clarification on the amount of converters that have a configuration for a fixed `_tokenAddressIn` and `_tokenAddressOut`. In particular, each converter must have the configurations for `tokenAddressIn` to be the `destinationBaseAsset`. If there is only to be one `SingleTokenConverter` for each destination base asset, then there should only be one possible `SingleTokenConverter` that supports conversion with `_tokenAddressIn` and `_tokenAddressOut`. Thus the only potential other converter would be the `RiskFundConverter` as the `convertibleBaseAsset` may be the destination base asset for one of the `SingleTokenConverter`. If there is only to be one `RiskFundConverter`, then with the assumptions above this leaves at most 2 converters that may support the configuration. If these assumptions are correct, then the quick sort may be unnecessarily complex as there should only be 2 converters to sort.
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