Mellow Protocol audit

SherlockCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Audit competition · firm’s term: public best efforts audit contest

Sherlock reviewed Mellow (Mellow Protocol audit) on 28 Jul 2025: 15 findings, 0 critical; 13 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on GitHub.

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Findings15

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High006
Medium027
Low000
HighConsensus.checkSignatures doesn't check duplication of signersFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighIncorrect performance fee calculation in FeeManagerFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighProtocol Fee Multiple Accrual in Oracle.submitReportsFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighRedeemQueue Accounting Mismatch Between Batch Creation and Claim EligibilityFixed

The report gives no description here.

HighRedeems through RedeemQueue avoid paying management and performance fee.Fixed

The report gives no description here.

HighUnable to withdraw native tokens because vault and redeem hooks do not handle native tokensFixed

The report gives no description here.

MediumcancelDepositRequest() always reverts due to modifying FenwickTree with wrong indexFixed

The report gives no description here.

MediumDoS in Redemption Due to Unchecked Asset Support in SubvaultsFixed

The report gives no description here.

MediumETH redemptions via SignatureRedeemQu eue are broken due to missing receive functionFixed

The report gives no description here.

MediumFlawed Logic in ShareManager Inverts Transfer Whitelist BehaviorFixed

The report gives no description here.

Show 3 more
MediumMalicious Users Can Perpetually Lock feeRecipient Shares via Targeted Lockup ResetFixed

The report gives no description here.

MediumProtocol Fee Exponential Compounding in ShareModule.handleReportFixed

The report gives no description here.

MediumTargeted-lockup bypass: freshly minted shares can be transferred immediately in the same transfer() or transferFrom() callFixed

The report gives no description here.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

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Part of Mellow’s security record

Mellow
Audits7 audits by 3 firmsLast audit Nov 2025, by Nethermind Security.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 7 reports.
Open Mellow’s security record

Security firm

Sherlock

46 projects reviewed · 67 reports · latest Sep 2026

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