Venus - WUSDMLiquidator

The `run()` function emits multiple events in the context of the Comptroller and different VTokens on every execution. Since `run()` is unprotected and can be invoked repeatedly, this behavior may lead to unexpected and potentially disruptive events. Furthermore, the function presumes that the `VWUSDM` market is paused for `Action.MINT` and `Action.ENTER_MARKET`, and maintains the paused state after execution. This may be unintended if the market gets unpaused in the future.

```sol=109 uint256 internal constant MAX_CLOSE_FACTOR_MANTISSA = 1e18; // 1.0, temporarily ``` `WUSDMLiquidator` assumes the Comptroller code will be upgraded, allowing `closeFactorMantissa` to be set higher than the regular 0.9e18. It is unclear when and if the `MAX_CLOSE_FACTOR_MANTISSA` will be restored. ```sol=124 COMPTROLLER.setCloseFactor(1e18); ``` `WUSDMLiquidator` uses the 1e18 value directly as a close factor. It's reasonable to use `COMPTROLLER.MAX_CLOSE_FACTOR_MANTISSA()` instead to ensure the call will always be successful. Or `MANTISSA_ONE` constant in case it is supposed to revert in case of unexpected COMPTROLLER behavior.

Despite the [description](https://community.venus.io/t/proposal-partial-liquidity-restoration-for-wusdm-on-venus-zksync/5013) stating that the WUSDMLiquidator is meant to be executed solely by Governance, the `run()` function is unprotected and can be called multiple times by any user.