Venus - Prime and Oracle Changes

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s series

CertiK reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Prime and Oracle Changes) on 19 Dec 2023: 13 findings, 0 critical; 8 marked fixed, 5 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Venus Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings13

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low408
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

The centralization risks indicated here are only related to those within the scope of the delta audit. CertiK has audited much of the codebase before and their relevant centralization risks can be found in our audit reports here: [https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus](https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus). For those contracts that have not been audited by CertiK, we recommend reviewing the contracts and carefully considering the centralization risks present. ### BinanceOracle In the contract `BinanceOracle` the role `_owner` has authority over the function `setFeedRegistryAddress()`. Any compromise to the `_owner` may allow the hacker to change the feed registry address to a malicious contract and return incorrect prices. In the worst case scenario, this can be used to steal all borrowable funds from the protocol. ### VAIController In the contract `VAIController` the role `admin` has authority over the function `_setPrimeToken()`. Any compromise to the `admin` may allow the hacker to change the prime token address preventing those that hold true prime tokens from minting VAI and allowing them to mint VAI when not holding a prime token. ### Isolated Pools Comptroller In the contract `Comptroller`, the role `_owner` has authority over the function `setPrimeToken()`. Any compromise to the `_owner` may allow the hacker to change the prime token address, preventing the timely update of scores due to changes in any user's market interactions.

LowDuplicate File NameOpen

There are two interfaces named `IPrime`. One interface has the majority of the external facing functions of `Prime`, however, the other interface only has the functions necessary for the comptroller to call during the verify hooks.

LowEither `sidRegistryAddress` Or `feedRegistryAddreOpen

If the current chain supports space ID, then `sidRegistryAddress` should be set upon initialization. Otherwise, the `feedRegistryAddress` should be set upon initialization or the oracle will revert when calling `latestRoundDataByName()` on the zero address.

LowMissing Input ValidationOpen

### Prime - In function `addMarket()`, there is no check that the input `comptroller` represents a pool supported by the protocol. In particular if it is an isolated pool it should be registered in the pool registry and if not then it should be the main pool. - In the constructor, there is no check that the addresses used to set `WRAPPED_NATIVE_TOKEN` and `NATIVE_MARKET` are nonzero. ### TimeManager.sol - The logic of the constructor makes the check that if `timeBased_` is false, then `blocksPerYear` is nonzero in that case. In order to ensure the intended set up in all cases, a check should also be included to ensure that if `timeBased_` is true, then `blocksPerYear` is zero in that case.

LowUnused ParametersOpen

The verify hooks are being added into the `Comptroller` logic during the upgrade corresponding to this audit. It is unnecessary to include parameters which are unused in the verify logic. They can be added back in a future upgrade if they are ever needed.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (14)

  • contracts/oracles/BinanceOracle.sol
  • contracts/oracles/ChainlinkOracle.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/Prime/IPrime.sol
  • contracts/Utils/TimeManager.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/Prime/PrimeLiquidityProvider.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/Prime/PrimeStorage.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/VAI/VAIController.sol
  • contracts/ComptrollerStorage.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/Prime/Interfaces/IPrime.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/VAI/VAIControllerStorage.sol
  • contracts/oracles/ArbiChainlinkOracle.sol
  • contracts/Comptroller.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/Prime/Prime.sol
  • contracts/VToken.sol

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
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