Part of CertiK’s series
CertiK reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Prime and Oracle Changes) on 19 Dec 2023: 13 findings, 0 critical; 8 marked fixed, 5 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 4 | 0 | 8 |
The centralization risks indicated here are only related to those within the scope of the delta audit. CertiK has audited much of the codebase before and their relevant centralization risks can be found in our audit reports here: [https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus](https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus). For those contracts that have not been audited by CertiK, we recommend reviewing the contracts and carefully considering the centralization risks present. ### BinanceOracle In the contract `BinanceOracle` the role `_owner` has authority over the function `setFeedRegistryAddress()`. Any compromise to the `_owner` may allow the hacker to change the feed registry address to a malicious contract and return incorrect prices. In the worst case scenario, this can be used to steal all borrowable funds from the protocol. ### VAIController In the contract `VAIController` the role `admin` has authority over the function `_setPrimeToken()`. Any compromise to the `admin` may allow the hacker to change the prime token address preventing those that hold true prime tokens from minting VAI and allowing them to mint VAI when not holding a prime token. ### Isolated Pools Comptroller In the contract `Comptroller`, the role `_owner` has authority over the function `setPrimeToken()`. Any compromise to the `_owner` may allow the hacker to change the prime token address, preventing the timely update of scores due to changes in any user's market interactions.
There are two interfaces named `IPrime`. One interface has the majority of the external facing functions of `Prime`, however, the other interface only has the functions necessary for the comptroller to call during the verify hooks.
If the current chain supports space ID, then `sidRegistryAddress` should be set upon initialization. Otherwise, the `feedRegistryAddress` should be set upon initialization or the oracle will revert when calling `latestRoundDataByName()` on the zero address.
### Prime - In function `addMarket()`, there is no check that the input `comptroller` represents a pool supported by the protocol. In particular if it is an isolated pool it should be registered in the pool registry and if not then it should be the main pool. - In the constructor, there is no check that the addresses used to set `WRAPPED_NATIVE_TOKEN` and `NATIVE_MARKET` are nonzero. ### TimeManager.sol - The logic of the constructor makes the check that if `timeBased_` is false, then `blocksPerYear` is nonzero in that case. In order to ensure the intended set up in all cases, a check should also be included to ensure that if `timeBased_` is true, then `blocksPerYear` is zero in that case.
The verify hooks are being added into the `Comptroller` logic during the upgrade corresponding to this audit. It is unnecessary to include parameters which are unused in the verify logic. They can be added back in a future upgrade if they are ever needed.
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Repository and files the report names (14)
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