Drive Crypto

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed Drive Crypto on 21 Nov 2022: 18 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 7 acknowledged, 10 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Drive Crypto’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings18

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High040
Medium031
Low1000
LowLack of reasonable boundaryOpen

The variables `_maxTxAmount`, `_maxAccountAmount`, `_minAmountToAutoSwap`, and `minTokenHoldToStake` do not have reasonable boundaries, so they can be given arbitrary values after deploying.

LowMissing Receive FunctionOpen

The owner account can call the function `safeWithdraw()` to withdraw all ETHs. However, there is no `receive()` or `fallback()` function in the SwapHelper.sol, so this contract cannot receive native tokens.

LowNo Function To Disable TokenOpen

The admin can call the function `enableToken()` to set the `pauseToken` to false, however, there is no function to set the `pauseToken` to true.

LowPotential Flashloan AttackOpen

Flash loans are a way to borrow large amounts of money for a certain fee. The requirement is that the loans need to be returned within the same transaction in a block. If not, the transaction will be reverted. An attacker can use the borrowed money as the initial funds for an exploit to enlarge the profit and/or manipulate the token price in the decentralized exchanges. We find that the function `executeSwap()` rely on price calculations that are based on-chain, meaning that they would be susceptible to flash-loan attacks by manipulating the price of given pairs to the attacker's benefit.

LowPotential Gas ExhaustionOpen

The `for` loop within the function `multiTransfer()` takes unbounded arrays' lengths as the maximum iteration times. If the size of the array `users` grows large, iterating through the entire array could be an expensive operation. Even worse, it could exceed the gas limit per block.

LowPotential Sandwich AttacksOpen

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: ```solidity=337 uint256 wbnbAmount = getAmountOut(totalAmount, reserve1, reserve0); swapToken(liquidityPair, reversed ? 0 : wbnbAmount, reversed ? wbnbAmount : 0, secondaryPairLocal); uint256 wbnbBalanceNew = getTokenBalanceOf(wbnbAddress, secondaryPairLocal); require(wbnbBalanceNew == wbnbBalanceBefore + wbnbAmount, "Wrong amount of swapped on WBNB"); ``` ```solidity=349 uint256 busdAmount = getAmountOut(amountOut, reserve1, reserve0); swapToken(secondaryPairLocal, reversed ? 0 : busdAmount, reversed ? busdAmount : 0, swapHelper); uint256 busdBalanceNew = getTokenBalanceOf(busdAddress, swapHelper); require(busdBalanceNew == busdBalanceBefore + busdAmount, "Wrong amount of swapped on BUSD"); amountOut = busdAmount; ```

LowThird Party DependencyOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third-party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=19 address constant private WBNB = 0xbb4CdB9CBd36B01bD1cBaEBF2De08d9173bc095c; // BSC WBNB address constant private BUSD = 0xe9e7CEA3DedcA5984780Bafc599bD69ADd087D56; // BSC BUSD ``` ```solidity=88 PancakeRouter router = PancakeRouter(0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E); // BSC ``` - The function `DriveCrypto.constructor` interacts with third party contract with `PancakeFactory` interface via `router`.

LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` CaOpen

The return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=12 function safeTransfer(address token, address receiver, uint256 amount) external isWithdrawer { IERC20(token).transfer(receiver, amount); } ```

LowUnused Return ValueOpen

The return value of an external call is not stored in a local or state variable. ```solidity=11 function safeApprove(address token, address spender, uint256 amount) external isWithdrawer { IERC20(token).approve(spender, amount); } ``` --- ```solidity=11 function safeApprove(address token, address spender, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { IERC20(token).approve(spender, amount); } ```

LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableOpen

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x61ccf5351d63b36ae2f7f4d0f0f9a65989c1de7dChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of Drive Crypto’s security record

Drive Crypto
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Nov 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Drive Crypto’s security record

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CertiK

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