Drive Crypto has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 21 Nov 2022; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 high, 3 medium, 10 low (10 open, 7 acknowledged).
Centralization Related Risks In AttributeMap.sol
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Related Risks In DriveCrypto.sol
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in SwapHelper.sol
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Logic Issue On Function `burn()`
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Incorrect initialization Of the `_permissions`
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Potential Loss of Rewards
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Lack of reasonable boundary
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Missing Receive Function
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
No Function To Disable Token
Drive Crypto · CertiK · 21 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Drive Crypto | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 4 high · 4 medium · 10 low 1 fixed · 7 acknowledged · 10 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Low | 10 | 0 | 0 |
The variables `_maxTxAmount`, `_maxAccountAmount`, `_minAmountToAutoSwap`, and `minTokenHoldToStake` do not have reasonable boundaries, so they can be given arbitrary values after deploying.
Open the reportThe owner account can call the function `safeWithdraw()` to withdraw all ETHs. However, there is no `receive()` or `fallback()` function in the SwapHelper.sol, so this contract cannot receive native tokens.
Open the reportThe admin can call the function `enableToken()` to set the `pauseToken` to false, however, there is no function to set the `pauseToken` to true.
Open the reportFlash loans are a way to borrow large amounts of money for a certain fee. The requirement is that the loans need to be returned within the same transaction in a block. If not, the transaction will be reverted. An attacker can use the borrowed money as the initial funds for an exploit to enlarge the profit and/or manipulate the token price in the decentralized exchanges. We find that the function `executeSwap()` rely on price calculations that are based on-chain, meaning that they would be susceptible to flash-loan attacks by manipulating the price of given pairs to the attacker's benefit.
Open the reportThe `for` loop within the function `multiTransfer()` takes unbounded arrays' lengths as the maximum iteration times. If the size of the array `users` grows large, iterating through the entire array could be an expensive operation. Even worse, it could exceed the gas limit per block.
Open the reportA sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: ```solidity=337 uint256 wbnbAmount = getAmountOut(totalAmount, reserve1, reserve0); swapToken(liquidityPair, reversed ? 0 : wbnbAmount, reversed ? wbnbAmount : 0, secondaryPairLocal); uint256 wbnbBalanceNew = getTokenBalanceOf(wbnbAddress, secondaryPairLocal); require(wbnbBalanceNew == wbnbBalanceBefore + wbnbAmount, "Wrong amount of swapped on WBNB"); ``` ```solidity=349 uint256 busdAmount = getAmountOut(amountOut, reserve1, reserve0); swapToken(secondaryPairLocal, reversed ? 0 : busdAmount, reversed ? busdAmount : 0, swapHelper); uint256 busdBalanceNew = getTokenBalanceOf(busdAddress, swapHelper); require(busdBalanceNew == busdBalanceBefore + busdAmount, "Wrong amount of swapped on BUSD"); amountOut = busdAmount; ```
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third-party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=19 address constant private WBNB = 0xbb4CdB9CBd36B01bD1cBaEBF2De08d9173bc095c; // BSC WBNB address constant private BUSD = 0xe9e7CEA3DedcA5984780Bafc599bD69ADd087D56; // BSC BUSD ``` ```solidity=88 PancakeRouter router = PancakeRouter(0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E); // BSC ``` - The function `DriveCrypto.constructor` interacts with third party contract with `PancakeFactory` interface via `router`.
Open the reportThe return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=12 function safeTransfer(address token, address receiver, uint256 amount) external isWithdrawer { IERC20(token).transfer(receiver, amount); } ```
Open the reportThe return value of an external call is not stored in a local or state variable. ```solidity=11 function safeApprove(address token, address spender, uint256 amount) external isWithdrawer { IERC20(token).approve(spender, amount); } ``` --- ```solidity=11 function safeApprove(address token, address spender, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { IERC20(token).approve(spender, amount); } ```
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x61cc…de7d0x61ccf5351d63b36ae2f7f4d0f0f9a65989c1de7d | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Drive Crypto, dated 21 Nov 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“Drive Crypto”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Drive Crypto.
17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 high, 3 medium, 10 low (10 open, 7 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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