Rockstable

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed Rockstable on 7 Jun 2019: 11 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 7 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings11

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High002
Medium000
Low702
LowCentralization of PowerOpen

The LocalToken values for the transaction fee rate, the payment share, and the tax rate dictate the calculations for all token tranfers in all Payment2 instances that use the same token. Exploit Scenario: If control of a LocalToken instance is lost, every Payment2 instance that depends on that token can potentially transfer tokens in the wrong amounts to the various associated accounts after a call to refreshFeeParams.

LowConstructor Argument ValidationOpen

The TokenTimeLock constructor should ensure that the token and beneficiary parameters are non-zero addresses.

LowDeregistering Vendors During TransactionsOpen

A vendor (an instance of Payment2) can be deregistered from an instance of PureMoney2 while there is a pending payment for the vendor preventing the vendor from receiving an outstanding transaction (as recorded by a non-zero roksExpected value).

LowNo Share for Small Vendor PaymentsOpen

There is no share when xactionFee < DENOMINATOR / pmtShare in payInROKS. The UniversalToken constrains the pmtShare to be less than one third of the DENOMINATOR (currently 3333). In the worst case if the pmtShare is set to 1 then xactionFee must be at least 10000 for a transaction fee to be processed. In the best case when feeRate is set to 3333 then xactionFee must be at least 4 for a share to be payed.

LowNo Transaction Fee for Small Vendor PaymentsOpen

There is no transaction fee when netToVendor < DENOMINATOR / pmtShare in payInROKS. The UniversalToken constrains the feeRate to be less than one quarter of the DENOMINATOR (currently 2500). In the worst case if the feeRate is set to 1 then netToVendor must be at least 10000 for a transaction fee to be processed. In the best case when feeRate is set to 2500 then `netToVendor must be at least 4 for a transaction fee to be payed.

LowRounding in Taxes, Fees, and Shares CalculationsOpen

The rounding error in the calculations in payInROKS can be reduced by performing one division. For example, the xactionFee calculation: netToVendor = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor xactionFee = netToVendor.mul(feeRate) / DENOMINATOR; = (roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor).mul(feeRate) / DENOMINATOR; // subst = (roks.mul(DENOMINATOR).mul(feeRate) / priceFactor) / DENOMINATOR; // mult in numerator = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR).mul(feeRate) / priceFactor.mul(DENOMINATOR); // mult by inverse

LowSingle ROKS PaymentsOpen

It is not possible to pay 1 ROKS to a vendor in the current implementation of payInROKS. For example, assume that payTax == false: netToVendor = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor; // original = roks.mul(10000) / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); // subst = 1.mul(10000) / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); = 10000 / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); = 0 // rounding xactionfee = roks.sub(netToVendor) = 1.sub(0) = 1 Exploit Scenario: Dividing payments into single ROKS increments diverts all payment to evangelist.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (11)

  • contracts/Migrations.sol
  • contracts/TokenTimelock.sol
  • contracts/IPayment2.sol
  • contracts/LocalToken.sol
  • contracts/puremoney2.sol
  • contracts/payment2.sol
  • contracts/Capped.sol
  • contracts/universaltoken.sol
  • contracts/RSTIShares.sol
  • contracts/depot.sol
  • contracts/token.sol

Part of Rockstable’s security record

Rockstable
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jun 2019, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Rockstable’s security record

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Quantstamp

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