Quantstamp reviewed Rockstable on 7 Jun 2019: 11 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 7 open.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 7 | 0 | 2 |
The LocalToken values for the transaction fee rate, the payment share, and the tax rate dictate the calculations for all token tranfers in all Payment2 instances that use the same token. Exploit Scenario: If control of a LocalToken instance is lost, every Payment2 instance that depends on that token can potentially transfer tokens in the wrong amounts to the various associated accounts after a call to refreshFeeParams.
The TokenTimeLock constructor should ensure that the token and beneficiary parameters are non-zero addresses.
A vendor (an instance of Payment2) can be deregistered from an instance of PureMoney2 while there is a pending payment for the vendor preventing the vendor from receiving an outstanding transaction (as recorded by a non-zero roksExpected value).
There is no share when xactionFee < DENOMINATOR / pmtShare in payInROKS. The UniversalToken constrains the pmtShare to be less than one third of the DENOMINATOR (currently 3333). In the worst case if the pmtShare is set to 1 then xactionFee must be at least 10000 for a transaction fee to be processed. In the best case when feeRate is set to 3333 then xactionFee must be at least 4 for a share to be payed.
There is no transaction fee when netToVendor < DENOMINATOR / pmtShare in payInROKS. The UniversalToken constrains the feeRate to be less than one quarter of the DENOMINATOR (currently 2500). In the worst case if the feeRate is set to 1 then netToVendor must be at least 10000 for a transaction fee to be processed. In the best case when feeRate is set to 2500 then `netToVendor must be at least 4 for a transaction fee to be payed.
The rounding error in the calculations in payInROKS can be reduced by performing one division. For example, the xactionFee calculation: netToVendor = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor xactionFee = netToVendor.mul(feeRate) / DENOMINATOR; = (roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor).mul(feeRate) / DENOMINATOR; // subst = (roks.mul(DENOMINATOR).mul(feeRate) / priceFactor) / DENOMINATOR; // mult in numerator = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR).mul(feeRate) / priceFactor.mul(DENOMINATOR); // mult by inverse
It is not possible to pay 1 ROKS to a vendor in the current implementation of payInROKS. For example, assume that payTax == false: netToVendor = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor; // original = roks.mul(10000) / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); // subst = 1.mul(10000) / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); = 10000 / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); = 0 // rounding xactionfee = roks.sub(netToVendor) = 1.sub(0) = 1 Exploit Scenario: Dividing payments into single ROKS increments diverts all payment to evangelist.
The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.
Repository and files the report names (11)
240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026
See Quantstamp’s auditsSomething wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us