Rockstable has 1 public audit report from Quantstamp; dated 7 Jun 2019; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 7 low (all open).
Centralization of Power
Rockstable · Quantstamp · 7 Jun 2019 · Report ↗
Constructor Argument Validation
Rockstable · Quantstamp · 7 Jun 2019 · Report ↗
Deregistering Vendors During Transactions
Rockstable · Quantstamp · 7 Jun 2019 · Report ↗
No Share for Small Vendor Payments
Rockstable · Quantstamp · 7 Jun 2019 · Report ↗
No Transaction Fee for Small Vendor Payments
Rockstable · Quantstamp · 7 Jun 2019 · Report ↗
Rounding in Taxes, Fees, and Shares Calculations
Rockstable · Quantstamp · 7 Jun 2019 · Report ↗
Single ROKS Payments
Rockstable · Quantstamp · 7 Jun 2019 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rockstable | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 2 high · 9 low 4 fixed · 7 open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 7 | 0 | 2 |
The LocalToken values for the transaction fee rate, the payment share, and the tax rate dictate the calculations for all token tranfers in all Payment2 instances that use the same token. Exploit Scenario: If control of a LocalToken instance is lost, every Payment2 instance that depends on that token can potentially transfer tokens in the wrong amounts to the various associated accounts after a call to refreshFeeParams.
Open the reportThe TokenTimeLock constructor should ensure that the token and beneficiary parameters are non-zero addresses.
Open the reportA vendor (an instance of Payment2) can be deregistered from an instance of PureMoney2 while there is a pending payment for the vendor preventing the vendor from receiving an outstanding transaction (as recorded by a non-zero roksExpected value).
Open the reportThere is no share when xactionFee < DENOMINATOR / pmtShare in payInROKS. The UniversalToken constrains the pmtShare to be less than one third of the DENOMINATOR (currently 3333). In the worst case if the pmtShare is set to 1 then xactionFee must be at least 10000 for a transaction fee to be processed. In the best case when feeRate is set to 3333 then xactionFee must be at least 4 for a share to be payed.
Open the reportThere is no transaction fee when netToVendor < DENOMINATOR / pmtShare in payInROKS. The UniversalToken constrains the feeRate to be less than one quarter of the DENOMINATOR (currently 2500). In the worst case if the feeRate is set to 1 then netToVendor must be at least 10000 for a transaction fee to be processed. In the best case when feeRate is set to 2500 then `netToVendor must be at least 4 for a transaction fee to be payed.
Open the reportThe rounding error in the calculations in payInROKS can be reduced by performing one division. For example, the xactionFee calculation: netToVendor = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor xactionFee = netToVendor.mul(feeRate) / DENOMINATOR; = (roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor).mul(feeRate) / DENOMINATOR; // subst = (roks.mul(DENOMINATOR).mul(feeRate) / priceFactor) / DENOMINATOR; // mult in numerator = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR).mul(feeRate) / priceFactor.mul(DENOMINATOR); // mult by inverse
Open the reportIt is not possible to pay 1 ROKS to a vendor in the current implementation of payInROKS. For example, assume that payTax == false: netToVendor = roks.mul(DENOMINATOR) / priceFactor; // original = roks.mul(10000) / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); // subst = 1.mul(10000) / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); = 10000 / 10000.add(payTax ? _taxRateMult : 0).add(feeRate); = 0 // rounding xactionfee = roks.sub(netToVendor) = 1.sub(0) = 1 Exploit Scenario: Dividing payments into single ROKS increments diverts all payment to evangelist.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Rockstable, dated 7 Jun 2019. The latest is by Quantstamp (“Rockstable”).
Quantstamp wrote the report Trustblock holds for Rockstable.
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 7 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.
Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.
<head><script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script></head><body><divdata-tb-project-widgetdata-tb-project-slug="rockstable"></div></body>
Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.
Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us