PD Land

In the function `mintAfterSale`, the role `owner` could mint any amount of tokens to itself after the public sale only if each type of tokens are no more than `MAX_PUBLIC_LAND_SALE_PER_TYPE`.

In the contract `LandNFT` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `LandNFT` the role `hokWithdrawAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `hokWithdrawAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `LandNFT` the role `saleContractAdddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `saleContractAdddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. 

In the contract `PrivatePublicLandSale` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `PrivatePublicLandSale` the role `hokMinterAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `hokMinterAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `PrivatePublicLandSale` the role `hokWithdrawAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `hokWithdrawAddress` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. 

In the contract `LandNFT` and `PrivatePublicLandSale`, the role `hokWithdrawAddress` could withdraw all the ETHs to the `hokWithdrawAddress`, which is an EOA. In addition, the `owner` role could change the `hokWithdrawAddress` to any address, which could be EOA as well.

`public` functions that are never called by the contract could be declared as `external`. `external` functions are more efficient than `public` functions.

In the functions `getPrivateRemLandType()`, `getPublicRemLandType()`, `getRemPrivateSaleSupply()` and `getRemPublicSaleSupply()`, since the counters and `_tokenIds` are shared in each sale stage, the calling of these functions may cause logical issue. e.g. After the private sale, the calling of `getPrivateRemLandType()` may result in an overflow error or a wrong number.

Before private sale, the `hokMinterAddress` could mint 700 tokens at most to itself, and the limit for each token type is 500. However, if the `hokMinterAddress` mints 500 tokens in one type, no one could mint this type of token in the private sale. In addition, keeping 500 tokens in one type for the `hokMinterAddress` may cause the price raising of this token type, however, it gives the power that the `hokMinterAddress` may sell all of them in another market and crash the price, as a result, the investors may suffer losses.

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

In the function `isWhitelisted()`, users could view if they are in the `_memberslist`, however, they cannot know their `_memberslist[users[i]].balance` conveniently.

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to implement the third-party ERC721A protocols. The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of 3rd parties can possibly create severe impacts.