PD Land

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed PD Land on 18 Apr 2022: 17 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 12 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings17

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High400
Medium002
Low803
MediumLogic issue of the private sale conditionFixed

According to the following code: ```solidity function mintPrivateSale(uint8 landType, uint256 numTokens) ... require(_memberslist[msg.sender].minted < _memberslist[msg.sender].balance, "User has minted max allowed number"); ... ``` , the condition will be bypassed when `_memberslist[msg.sender].minted` is a little smaller than `_memberslist[msg.sender].balance`, but it is still possible to make `_memberslist[msg.sender].minted` exceed the limit of `_memberslist[msg.sender].balance` after this call of `mintPrivateSale()`.

MediumLogical issue in `whitelistMembers()`Fixed

According to the following code: ```solidity function whitelistMembers (address[] memory users, uint8[] memory balances) public onlyOwner { saleActive = landNFT.getSaleStatus(); require(!saleActive, "Cannot whitelist"); for (uint i = 0; i < users.length; i++) { _memberslist[users[i]].exists = true; _memberslist[users[i]].balance = balances[i]; _memberslist[users[i]].minted = 0; } } ``` , the condition check could be bypassed if the `owner` changed `saleActive` in the contract `landNFT`, hence it cannot prevent an existing member in the `_memberslist` from being modified during a private sale.

LowDiscussion on the `changeSaleContractAddress()`Fixed

In the contract `LandNFT`, the `owner` role could change `saleContractAdddress` arbitrarily by calling `changeSaleContractAddress()`, as a result, the `owner` could designate any contract or EOA to mint any amount of tokens, which may cause unlimited minting issue. We would like to confirm if the use of `changeSaleContractAddress()` is to deploy other sale contracts. In addition, it is also recommended to mitigate the possible unlimited minting issue in this case.

LowRedundant codeFixed

These variables are defined but not used in the contract.

LowUnlocked Compiler VersionFixed

The contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to different compiler versions. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • LandNFT.sol
  • PrivatePublicSale.sol

Part of PD Land’s security record

PD Land
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Apr 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
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CertiK

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