CertiK reviewed BUSDChain (busdchain.) on 3 Jan 2023: 17 findings, 0 critical; 4 acknowledged, 13 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Low | 13 | 0 | 0 |
In the function `withdraw()`, the 'wL', 'wMY' and `dfWallets` can only get the direct and match bonus. However, there is no restriction in the function `deposit()` that these addresses cannot deposit. If they call the function `deposit()`, they will lose the deposit payout.
The loop is to move the data after index j forward, but one more loop is executed. ```solidity=450 for(uint256 k = j; k <= pool_size; k++) { pool_top[k] = pool_top[k + 1]; } ```
From the contract, the power tokens are used as follows: 1. When the users deposit the `busd` token, they can get the five times the power tokens through the function `deposit()` 2. when the users withdraw, the power tokens are sent to the superior as a reward through the function `withdraw()` 3. If the `burnStatus` is true , the owner of the power tokens can burn them through the function `burnPower()` 4. Owner can transfer the power tokens to any address through the function `powerTransfer()` There is no logic related to power tokens in the contract, are the power tokens being used as intended and are there other uses for the power tokens?
There are many hardcode addresses in this codebase.
When transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f ```solidity=553 token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount); ``` - Transferring tokens by `_amount`. ```solidity=563 _deposit(msg.sender, _amount); ``` - This function call executes the following operation. - In `BUSDChain._deposit`, - `_pollDeposits(_addr, _amount);` - In `BUSDChain._pollDeposits`, - `pool_users_refs_deposits_sum[pool_cycle][upline] += _amount;` - The `_amount` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees.
On the function `withdraw()`, the loop that checks whether the sender is on the `dfWallets` could be more efficient if it aborted the loop once it has found a match.
The `withdraw()` function has the `whenNotPaused` modifier which checks that the contract is unpaused. If the owner pauses the contract, the caller can call the `deposit()` function but not the `withdraw()` function. Their tokens will be locked in the contract.
The `_upline` address is missing a check that it is not `address(0)`. If the `address(0)` is in the whitelist, the caller can register the `address(0)` as the upline. The caller considers he is already registered, then he calls the function `deposit()`, but is prompted "You need to register first".
The `wL`, `wMY`, and `dfWallets` can not get the pool bonus because the initial state of the `pool_exclude` is `true`. If the owner sets their status to `false`, then they can get the pool bonus, but the function `withdraw()` does not handle the logic about the pool bonus, so they may lose the pool bonus.
In the function `register()`, the whitelist can become upline without the deposit amount, the whitelist will get the direct and pool bonus when the users call the function `deposit()` or get the match bonus when the users call the function `withdraw()`. Due to the deposit amount being 0, then the max payout is 0. So the whitelist calls the function `withdraw()` will revert because it cannot pass the check on line 598.
The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=195 IERC20 token; ``` - The contract `BUSDChain` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `token`. --- ```solidity=197 IERC20 power; ``` - The contract `BUSDChain` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `power`.
The return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=865 power.transfer(_addr, _amount); ```
Weak PRNG due to a modulo on `block.timestamp`, `block.difficulty`, `msg.sender`, `block.coinbase`, `block.number`, `gasLeft` or `blockhash`. These can be influenced by miners to some extent, so they should be avoided. ```solidity=529 _upline = dfWallets[random() % 12]; ```
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xd55b…69af0xd55bb498716aae08a761077e1a196fd42ce669af | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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