BUSDChain has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 3 Jan 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 medium, 13 low (13 open, 4 acknowledged).
Centralization Related Risks
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
Incorrect available payout
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
owner can register
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
'wL', 'wMY' and `dfWallets` can not withdraw depo
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
An extra loop is executed
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
discussion : the use of the power token
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
Hardcode Address
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
Incompatibility with Deflationary Tokens
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
Loop Optimization
busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| busdchain. | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on BNB Chain | None open | Findings: 2 high · 2 medium · 13 low 4 acknowledged · 13 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Low | 13 | 0 | 0 |
In the function `withdraw()`, the 'wL', 'wMY' and `dfWallets` can only get the direct and match bonus. However, there is no restriction in the function `deposit()` that these addresses cannot deposit. If they call the function `deposit()`, they will lose the deposit payout.
Open the reportThe loop is to move the data after index j forward, but one more loop is executed. ```solidity=450 for(uint256 k = j; k <= pool_size; k++) { pool_top[k] = pool_top[k + 1]; } ```
Open the reportFrom the contract, the power tokens are used as follows: 1. When the users deposit the `busd` token, they can get the five times the power tokens through the function `deposit()` 2. when the users withdraw, the power tokens are sent to the superior as a reward through the function `withdraw()` 3. If the `burnStatus` is true , the owner of the power tokens can burn them through the function `burnPower()` 4. Owner can transfer the power tokens to any address through the function `powerTransfer()` There is no logic related to power tokens in the contract, are the power tokens being used as intended and are there other uses for the power tokens?
Open the reportThere are many hardcode addresses in this codebase.
Open the reportWhen transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f ```solidity=553 token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount); ``` - Transferring tokens by `_amount`. ```solidity=563 _deposit(msg.sender, _amount); ``` - This function call executes the following operation. - In `BUSDChain._deposit`, - `_pollDeposits(_addr, _amount);` - In `BUSDChain._pollDeposits`, - `pool_users_refs_deposits_sum[pool_cycle][upline] += _amount;` - The `_amount` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees.
Open the reportOn the function `withdraw()`, the loop that checks whether the sender is on the `dfWallets` could be more efficient if it aborted the loop once it has found a match.
Open the reportThe `withdraw()` function has the `whenNotPaused` modifier which checks that the contract is unpaused. If the owner pauses the contract, the caller can call the `deposit()` function but not the `withdraw()` function. Their tokens will be locked in the contract.
Open the reportThe `_upline` address is missing a check that it is not `address(0)`. If the `address(0)` is in the whitelist, the caller can register the `address(0)` as the upline. The caller considers he is already registered, then he calls the function `deposit()`, but is prompted "You need to register first".
Open the reportThe `wL`, `wMY`, and `dfWallets` can not get the pool bonus because the initial state of the `pool_exclude` is `true`. If the owner sets their status to `false`, then they can get the pool bonus, but the function `withdraw()` does not handle the logic about the pool bonus, so they may lose the pool bonus.
Open the reportIn the function `register()`, the whitelist can become upline without the deposit amount, the whitelist will get the direct and pool bonus when the users call the function `deposit()` or get the match bonus when the users call the function `withdraw()`. Due to the deposit amount being 0, then the max payout is 0. So the whitelist calls the function `withdraw()` will revert because it cannot pass the check on line 598.
Open the reportThe contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=195 IERC20 token; ``` - The contract `BUSDChain` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `token`. --- ```solidity=197 IERC20 power; ``` - The contract `BUSDChain` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `power`.
Open the reportThe return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=865 power.transfer(_addr, _amount); ```
Open the reportWeak PRNG due to a modulo on `block.timestamp`, `block.difficulty`, `msg.sender`, `block.coinbase`, `block.number`, `gasLeft` or `blockhash`. These can be influenced by miners to some extent, so they should be avoided. ```solidity=529 _upline = dfWallets[random() % 12]; ```
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xd55b…69af0xd55bb498716aae08a761077e1a196fd42ce669af | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for BUSDChain, dated 3 Jan 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“busdchain.”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for BUSDChain.
17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 medium, 13 low (13 open, 4 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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