BUSDChain audit reports

BNB Chainbusdchain.com

BUSDChain has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 3 Jan 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm17

Statuses are the security firms’ own

17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 medium, 13 low (13 open, 4 acknowledged).

High
2
Medium
2
Low
13
  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Related Risks

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Acknowledged

    Incorrect available payout

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Acknowledged

    owner can register

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    'wL', 'wMY' and `dfWallets` can not withdraw depo

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    An extra loop is executed

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    discussion : the use of the power token

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Hardcode Address

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incompatibility with Deflationary Tokens

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Loop Optimization

    busdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023 · Report ↗

All 17 open and acknowledged findings

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
busdchain.Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on BNB ChainNone openFindings: 2 high · 2 medium · 13 low
4 acknowledged · 13 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings17

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium020
Low1300
Low'wL', 'wMY' and `dfWallets` can not withdraw depobusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

In the function `withdraw()`, the 'wL', 'wMY' and `dfWallets` can only get the direct and match bonus. However, there is no restriction in the function `deposit()` that these addresses cannot deposit. If they call the function `deposit()`, they will lose the deposit payout.

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LowAn extra loop is executedbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

The loop is to move the data after index j forward, but one more loop is executed. ```solidity=450 for(uint256 k = j; k <= pool_size; k++) { pool_top[k] = pool_top[k + 1]; } ```

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Lowdiscussion : the use of the power tokenbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

From the contract, the power tokens are used as follows: 1. When the users deposit the `busd` token, they can get the five times the power tokens through the function `deposit()` 2. when the users withdraw, the power tokens are sent to the superior as a reward through the function `withdraw()` 3. If the `burnStatus` is true , the owner of the power tokens can burn them through the function `burnPower()` 4. Owner can transfer the power tokens to any address through the function `powerTransfer()` There is no logic related to power tokens in the contract, are the power tokens being used as intended and are there other uses for the power tokens?

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LowHardcode Addressbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

There are many hardcode addresses in this codebase.

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LowIncompatibility with Deflationary Tokensbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

When transferring deflationary ERC20 tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user sends 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee), only 90 tokens actually arrived to the contract. However, a failure to discount such fees may allow the same user to withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. Reference: https://thoreum-finance.medium.com/what-exploit-happened-today-for-gocerberus-and-garuda-also-for-lokum-ybear-piggy-caramelswap-3943ee23a39f ```solidity=553 token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount); ``` - Transferring tokens by `_amount`. ```solidity=563 _deposit(msg.sender, _amount); ``` - This function call executes the following operation. - In `BUSDChain._deposit`, - `_pollDeposits(_addr, _amount);` - In `BUSDChain._pollDeposits`, - `pool_users_refs_deposits_sum[pool_cycle][upline] += _amount;` - The `_amount` appears to be used for bookkeeping purposes without compensating the potential transfer fees.

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LowLoop Optimizationbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

On the function `withdraw()`, the loop that checks whether the sender is on the `dfWallets` could be more efficient if it aborted the loop once it has found a match.

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LowMissing the `whenNotPaused` Modifierbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

The `withdraw()` function has the `whenNotPaused` modifier which checks that the contract is unpaused. If the owner pauses the contract, the caller can call the `deposit()` function but not the `withdraw()` function. Their tokens will be locked in the contract.

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LowMissing Zero Address Validationbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

The `_upline` address is missing a check that it is not `address(0)`. If the `address(0)` is in the whitelist, the caller can register the `address(0)` as the upline. The caller considers he is already registered, then he calls the function `deposit()`, but is prompted "You need to register first".

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LowPotential Loss of pool bonusbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

The `wL`, `wMY`, and `dfWallets` can not get the pool bonus because the initial state of the `pool_exclude` is `true`. If the owner sets their status to `false`, then they can get the pool bonus, but the function `withdraw()` does not handle the logic about the pool bonus, so they may lose the pool bonus.

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LowPotential whitelist can not withdraw bonuses asbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

In the function `register()`, the whitelist can become upline without the deposit amount, the whitelist will get the direct and pool bonus when the users call the function `deposit()` or get the match bonus when the users call the function `withdraw()`. Due to the deposit amount being 0, then the max payout is 0. So the whitelist calls the function `withdraw()` will revert because it cannot pass the check on line 598.

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LowThird Party Dependencybusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with one or more third party protocols. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assume their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. In addition, upgrades of third parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of third parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc. ```solidity=195 IERC20 token; ``` - The contract `BUSDChain` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `token`. --- ```solidity=197 IERC20 power; ``` - The contract `BUSDChain` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `power`.

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LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` Cabusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

The return value of the transfer()/transferFrom() call is not checked. ```solidity=865 power.transfer(_addr, _amount); ```

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LowWeak PRNGbusdchain. · CertiK · 3 Jan 2023Open

Weak PRNG due to a modulo on `block.timestamp`, `block.difficulty`, `msg.sender`, `block.coinbase`, `block.number`, `gasLeft` or `blockhash`. These can be influenced by miners to some extent, so they should be avoided. ```solidity=529 _upline = dfWallets[random() % 12]; ```

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0xd55bb498716aae08a761077e1a196fd42ce669afChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

BUSDChain: questions

Is BUSDChain audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for BUSDChain, dated 3 Jan 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“busdchain.”).

Who audited BUSDChain?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for BUSDChain.

Are there open findings in BUSDChain’s audits?

17 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 medium, 13 low (13 open, 4 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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