Venus - Allocation of Income

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Part of CertiK’s series

CertiK reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Allocation of Income) on 12 Sep 2023: 19 findings, 0 critical; 16 marked fixed, 3 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Venus Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings19

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low1016
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

The centralization risks indicated here are only related to those within the scope of the audit. CertiK has not audited the `venus-protocol` repository before and we recommend users to carefully review the handling of privileged roles throughout the codebase. CertiK has audited the `isolated-pools` repository and more information regarding the centralization risks can be found in our previous audits: [https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus](https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus). ### ProtocolShareReserve The `owner` has the privilege to call the following functions: - `setPoolRegistry()` - `setPrime()` Any compromise to the `owner` may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Set `poolRegistry` to a malicious contract. - Set `prime` to a malicious contract. The role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` can grant addresses the privilege to call the following functions: - `addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()` Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or these privileged functions may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Add or update distribution configs to have assets sent to themselves. ### PR262 VToken The following privileges were added: The role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` can grant addresses the privilege to call the following functions: - `_setReserveFactor()` - `_reduceReserves()` - `_setInterestRateModel()` - `setReduceReservesBlockDelta()` Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or these privileged functions may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Set the `reserveFactorMantissa` to any value up to the `reserveFactorMaxMantissa`. - Reduce the reserves by transferring them to the `protocolShareReserve`. - Set the interest rate model to a malicious contract so that rates are much higher or lower than expected. - Change the `reduceReservesBlockDelta` to have reduce reserves be called more or less frequently than expected. The role `admin` has authority over the following functions: - `setAccessControlManager()` - `setProtocolShareReserve()` Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Change the `accessControlManager` to a malicious contract to allow them to call any privileged functions that the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` can grant privilege to. - Change the `protocolShareReserve` to an address they control to have reserves transferred to themselves when reserves are reduced. ### PR289 VBNBAdmin The role `owner` has authority over the following functions: - `setProtocolShareReserve()` - `fallback()` Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Change the `protocolShareReserve` to a contract they control so that they receive `WBNB` when the reserves are reduced. - Call the fallback function, which will call the `vBNB` contract, allowing them to execute any functions the `VBNBAdmin` contract has access to. In particular, as `VBNBAdmin` will be made the admin of `vBNB`, they will be able to execute any of the external or public functions as well as any functions only executable by the `admin` role. The role `vBNB` has authority over the following functions: - `receive()` Any compromise to the `vBNB` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Send native tokens directly to the contract. ### PR207 VToken The role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` can grant addresses the privilege to call the following functions: - `setReduceReservesBlockDelta()` Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or these privileged functions may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Change the `reduceReservesBlockDelta` to have reduce reserves be called more or less frequently than expected.

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

`VBep20`, `Vtoken`, `VBNBAdmin`, and `ProtocolShareReserve` are upgradeable contracts and the `admin` of the proxy has the ability to update the implementation contract behind the proxy contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed to by proxy and steal all tokens held by the contracts or implement and execute other potentially malicious functionality.

LowLack Of Access ControlOpen

The following functions have no access control and can be called by anyone: - `releaseFunds()`, this may be called to release funds prior to an action that will be executed by one of the receiving contracts. This may allow for potential rate manipulations if the contracts logic depends on the amount of tokens held by the contract. - `updateAssetsState()`, this may be called after a user sends funds directly to the contract to increase the reserves for particular markets. In combination with `releaseFunds()` this can be used to send a large amount of tokens to one of receiving contracts. This may allow for potential rate manipulations if the contracts logic depends on the amount of tokens held by the contract.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (15)

  • contracts/Interfaces/IPrime.sol
  • contracts/Interfaces/ComptrollerInterface.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/VTokens/VToken.sol
  • contracts/Interfaces/IVToken.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/VTokens/VTokenInterfaces.sol
  • contracts/Tokens/VTokens/VBep20.sol
  • contracts/VTokenInterfaces.sol
  • contracts/Interfaces/IProtocolShareReserve.sol
  • contracts/Interfaces/PoolRegistryInterface.sol
  • contracts/Admin/VBNBAdmin.sol
  • contracts/Utils/ErrorReporter.sol
  • contracts/VToken.sol
  • contracts/Admin/VBNBAdminStorage.sol
  • contracts/ProtocolReserve/ProtocolShareReserve.sol
  • contracts/Interfaces/IIncomeDestination.sol

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
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