Quantstamp reviewed PowerTrade on 23 Sep 2020: 8 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 8 | 0 | 0 |
The clone-and-own approach involves copying and adjusting open source code at one's own discretion. From the development perspective, it is initially beneficial as it reduces the amount of effort. However, from the security perspective, it involves some risks as the code may not follow the best practices, may contain a security vulnerability, or may include intentionally or unintentionally modified upstream libraries. Based on the scope of this audit, the following files can instead be imported from libraries: * `CloneFactory.sol`: Optionality * `IERC20.sol`: OpenZeppelin * `ReentrancyGuard.sol`: OpenZeppelin * `SafeMath.sol`: OpenZeppelin
The contracts `Timelock.sol` and `Governor.sol` have been modified to allow updates to `pendingAdmin` without being subjected to the timelock by the `admin`. This also means that the `admin` role in `Timelock.sol` can be assigned to a new address without the timelock.
The following inputs/return values, if unvalidated, may create undesirable effects for the smart contracts: * `FuelToken.sol` may permenantly lose its minter if the current minter accidently sets the new minter as the zero address with `changeMinter()` * In `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiaries may be updated to address `0x0` through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()` * In `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiary schedules may also be overridden through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()`if the address of the `_newBeneficiary` already exists in `vestingSchedule`
Smart contracts will often have `owner` variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. However, this centralization of power needs to be made clear to the users, especially depending on the level of privilege the contract allows to the owner. In `FuelToken.sol`, the minter role has the power to arbitrary mint tokens for themselves or for potential malicious users.
The contract `Timelock.sol` has been modified to handle `delay` and `gracePeriod` as `uint` seconds while the original Compound contract explicitly enforces limits to these parameters in time units of days. This change may introduce the risk of having a unusually short delay and grace period through manual error when calling `setDelay()` or `setGracePeriod()`.
In the contract `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiaries currently cannot be updated through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()` before the vesting cliff as the function's call to `_drawDown()` will revert.
In `VestingContract.sol`, the rate of vesting tokens that the beneficary receive when calling `_drawDown()` is calculated based on the `amount` parameter in the beneficiary's schedule. When updating the beneficiary with the function `updateScheduleBeneficiary()`, the `amount` property for the new beneficiary's schedule is decreased. This means that down the line, the new beneficiary would receive the tokens at a slower rate than the original beneficiary.
In `FuelToken.sol`, the use of `uint32` for `BlockNumber` and `numCheckpoints` could conceivably result in the token's lockdown in the future as these numbers approach their max limits.
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Repository and files the report names (10)
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