PowerTrade

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed PowerTrade on 23 Sep 2020: 8 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen PowerTrade’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings10

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low800
LowClone-and-OwnOpen

The clone-and-own approach involves copying and adjusting open source code at one's own discretion. From the development perspective, it is initially beneficial as it reduces the amount of effort. However, from the security perspective, it involves some risks as the code may not follow the best practices, may contain a security vulnerability, or may include intentionally or unintentionally modified upstream libraries. Based on the scope of this audit, the following files can instead be imported from libraries: * `CloneFactory.sol`: Optionality * `IERC20.sol`: OpenZeppelin * `ReentrancyGuard.sol`: OpenZeppelin * `SafeMath.sol`: OpenZeppelin

LowLack of Timelock When Changing Admin AddressesOpen

The contracts `Timelock.sol` and `Governor.sol` have been modified to allow updates to `pendingAdmin` without being subjected to the timelock by the `admin`. This also means that the `admin` role in `Timelock.sol` can be assigned to a new address without the timelock.

LowMissing Input ValidationOpen

The following inputs/return values, if unvalidated, may create undesirable effects for the smart contracts: * `FuelToken.sol` may permenantly lose its minter if the current minter accidently sets the new minter as the zero address with `changeMinter()` * In `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiaries may be updated to address `0x0` through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()` * In `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiary schedules may also be overridden through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()`if the address of the `_newBeneficiary` already exists in `vestingSchedule`

LowPrivileged Roles and OwnershipOpen

Smart contracts will often have `owner` variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. However, this centralization of power needs to be made clear to the users, especially depending on the level of privilege the contract allows to the owner. In `FuelToken.sol`, the minter role has the power to arbitrary mint tokens for themselves or for potential malicious users.

LowTime Unit Changed in `Timelock.sol` When Compared to Compound ContractOpen

The contract `Timelock.sol` has been modified to handle `delay` and `gracePeriod` as `uint` seconds while the original Compound contract explicitly enforces limits to these parameters in time units of days. This change may introduce the risk of having a unusually short delay and grace period through manual error when calling `setDelay()` or `setGracePeriod()`.

LowUpdating Beneficiary before Vesting Cliff Will RevertOpen

In the contract `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiaries currently cannot be updated through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()` before the vesting cliff as the function's call to `_drawDown()` will revert.

LowUpdating Beneficiary Reduces Its Rate of Receiving TokensOpen

In `VestingContract.sol`, the rate of vesting tokens that the beneficary receive when calling `_drawDown()` is calculated based on the `amount` parameter in the beneficiary's schedule. When updating the beneficiary with the function `updateScheduleBeneficiary()`, the `amount` property for the new beneficiary's schedule is decreased. This means that down the line, the new beneficiary would receive the tokens at a slower rate than the original beneficiary.

LowUse of `uint32` for Block Number and CheckpointsOpen

In `FuelToken.sol`, the use of `uint32` for `BlockNumber` and `numCheckpoints` could conceivably result in the token's lockdown in the future as these numbers approach their max limits.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (10)

  • contracts/Governor.sol
  • contracts/FuelToken.sol
  • contracts/VestingContractWithoutDelegation.sol
  • contracts/SafeMath.sol
  • contracts/CloneFactory.sol
  • contracts/Timelock.sol
  • contracts/IERC20.sol
  • contracts/VestingContract.sol
  • contracts/VestingDepositAccount.sol
  • contracts/ReentrancyGuard.sol

Part of PowerTrade’s security record

PowerTrade
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Sep 2020, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open PowerTrade’s security record

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