PowerTrade has 1 public audit report from Quantstamp; dated 23 Sep 2020; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 8 low (all open).
Clone-and-Own
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Lack of Timelock When Changing Admin Addresses
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Missing Input Validation
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Privileged Roles and Ownership
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Time Unit Changed in `Timelock.sol` When Compared to Compound Contract
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Updating Beneficiary before Vesting Cliff Will Revert
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Updating Beneficiary Reduces Its Rate of Receiving Tokens
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Use of `uint32` for Block Number and Checkpoints
PowerTrade · Quantstamp · 23 Sep 2020 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PowerTrade | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 8 low 8 open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 8 | 0 | 0 |
The clone-and-own approach involves copying and adjusting open source code at one's own discretion. From the development perspective, it is initially beneficial as it reduces the amount of effort. However, from the security perspective, it involves some risks as the code may not follow the best practices, may contain a security vulnerability, or may include intentionally or unintentionally modified upstream libraries. Based on the scope of this audit, the following files can instead be imported from libraries: * `CloneFactory.sol`: Optionality * `IERC20.sol`: OpenZeppelin * `ReentrancyGuard.sol`: OpenZeppelin * `SafeMath.sol`: OpenZeppelin
Open the reportThe contracts `Timelock.sol` and `Governor.sol` have been modified to allow updates to `pendingAdmin` without being subjected to the timelock by the `admin`. This also means that the `admin` role in `Timelock.sol` can be assigned to a new address without the timelock.
Open the reportThe following inputs/return values, if unvalidated, may create undesirable effects for the smart contracts: * `FuelToken.sol` may permenantly lose its minter if the current minter accidently sets the new minter as the zero address with `changeMinter()` * In `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiaries may be updated to address `0x0` through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()` * In `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiary schedules may also be overridden through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()`if the address of the `_newBeneficiary` already exists in `vestingSchedule`
Open the reportSmart contracts will often have `owner` variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. However, this centralization of power needs to be made clear to the users, especially depending on the level of privilege the contract allows to the owner. In `FuelToken.sol`, the minter role has the power to arbitrary mint tokens for themselves or for potential malicious users.
Open the reportThe contract `Timelock.sol` has been modified to handle `delay` and `gracePeriod` as `uint` seconds while the original Compound contract explicitly enforces limits to these parameters in time units of days. This change may introduce the risk of having a unusually short delay and grace period through manual error when calling `setDelay()` or `setGracePeriod()`.
Open the reportIn the contract `VestingContract.sol`, beneficiaries currently cannot be updated through `updateScheduleBeneficiary()` before the vesting cliff as the function's call to `_drawDown()` will revert.
Open the reportIn `VestingContract.sol`, the rate of vesting tokens that the beneficary receive when calling `_drawDown()` is calculated based on the `amount` parameter in the beneficiary's schedule. When updating the beneficiary with the function `updateScheduleBeneficiary()`, the `amount` property for the new beneficiary's schedule is decreased. This means that down the line, the new beneficiary would receive the tokens at a slower rate than the original beneficiary.
Open the reportIn `FuelToken.sol`, the use of `uint32` for `BlockNumber` and `numCheckpoints` could conceivably result in the token's lockdown in the future as these numbers approach their max limits.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for PowerTrade, dated 23 Sep 2020. The latest is by Quantstamp (“PowerTrade”).
Quantstamp wrote the report Trustblock holds for PowerTrade.
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 8 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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