Moongate - Pentest

CertiKCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Penetration test of off-chain systemsNot counted as an audit report

CertiK reviewed Moongate (Moongate - Pentest) on 6 Nov 2024: 16 findings, 5 critical; 14 marked fixed, 2 open.

5 critical findings, fixed
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical005
High101
Medium002
Low106
HighBypass Management Portal LoginOpen

The Login functionality of the web portal for administrators is based on an invitation code. If the code is valid, another form is displayed for the user to enter their email and receive an access link. However, after the backend verifies the code's validity, it only responds with a true or false, without any token or additional information that can validate in subsequent steps that the user has entered a valid code. Therefore, if the response is intercepted and modified before it reaches the browser, the attacker can access the link access form to generate a new access link without knowing a valid invitation code.

LowLack of SSL PinningOpen

Certificate pinning is the process of associating the backend server with a particular X.509 certificate or public key instead of accepting any certificate signed by a trusted certificate authority. After storing ("pinning") the server certificate or public key, the mobile app will subsequently connect to the known server only. Withdrawing trust from external certificate authorities reduces the attack surface (after all, there are many cases of certificate authorities that have been compromised or tricked into issuing certificates to impostors). The certificate can be pinned and hardcoded into the app or retrieved at the time the app first connects to the backend. In the latter case, the certificate is associated with ("pinned" to) the host when the host is seen for the first time. This alternative is less secure because attackers intercepting the initial connection can inject their own certificates.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Part of Moongate’s security record

Moongate
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Nov 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn that report, 5 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open Moongate’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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