Moongate has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 6 Nov 2024; 5 critical findings, all marked fixed by the firms.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 low (all open).
Bypass Management Portal Login
Moongate - Pentest · CertiK · 6 Nov 2024 · Report ↗
Centralization Related Risks
Moongate - Audit · CertiK · 6 Nov 2024 · Report ↗
Lack of SSL Pinning
Moongate - Pentest · CertiK · 6 Nov 2024 · Report ↗
Check-Effect-Interaction pattern not used
Moongate - Audit · CertiK · 6 Nov 2024 · Report ↗
Newest first
1 other security report listed, not counted
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moongate - Pentest Penetration test of off-chain systemsNot counted as an audit report | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | 5 critical findings, fixed | Findings: 5 critical · 2 high · 2 medium · 7 low 14 fixed · 2 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Moongate - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 1 high · 5 low 4 fixed · 2 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 10 |
The Login functionality of the web portal for administrators is based on an invitation code. If the code is valid, another form is displayed for the user to enter their email and receive an access link. However, after the backend verifies the code's validity, it only responds with a true or false, without any token or additional information that can validate in subsequent steps that the user has entered a valid code. Therefore, if the response is intercepted and modified before it reaches the browser, the attacker can access the link access form to generate a new access link without knowing a valid invitation code.
Open the reportIn the contract `MoongateERC1155AirdropFactory` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and creates new instances of the `MoongateERC1155Airdrop` smart contract.  ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721AirdropFactory` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and creates new instances of the `MoongateERC721AirdropFactory` smart contract.  ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdropFactory` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and creates new instances of the `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdropFactory` smart contract.  ----- In the contract `MoongateERC1155Airdrop` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and performs the following actions. - mint new tokens - change the default and token royalty - change the URI - pause and unpause the smart contract  In the contract `MoongateERC1155Airdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grants Admin role.  ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721Airdrop` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and performs the following actions. - mint new tokens - change the base and token URI - change the default and token royalty - pause and unpause the smart contract  In the contract `MoongateERC721Airdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grants Admin role.  ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and performs the following actions. - mint new tokens - change the base and token URI - change the default and token royalty - pause and unpause the smart contract  In the contract `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grants Admin role. 
Open the reportCertificate pinning is the process of associating the backend server with a particular X.509 certificate or public key instead of accepting any certificate signed by a trusted certificate authority. After storing ("pinning") the server certificate or public key, the mobile app will subsequently connect to the known server only. Withdrawing trust from external certificate authorities reduces the attack surface (after all, there are many cases of certificate authorities that have been compromised or tricked into issuing certificates to impostors). The certificate can be pinned and hardcoded into the app or retrieved at the time the app first connects to the backend. In the latter case, the certificate is associated with ("pinned" to) the host when the host is seen for the first time. This alternative is less secure because attackers intercepting the initial connection can inject their own certificates.
Open the reportIn the `airdrop` and `airdropAutoId` functions, the code invokes `_safeMint(to, tokenId)`, before setting the token URI through `_setTokenURI(tokenId, uri)`. The order of these operations does not follow the recommended `Check-Effect-Interaction pattern`. When `_safeMint` is called, the receiver contract's `onERC721Received` callback could trigger a reentry into the original functions before the `_setTokenURI` is executed. While the issue is present in the code, its current context does not introduce any security impact.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Moongate, dated 6 Nov 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Moongate - Pentest”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Moongate.
4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 2 low (all open). Of 5 critical findings: all marked fixed by the firms. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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