Moongate - Audit

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Moongate (Moongate - Audit) on 6 Nov 2024: 6 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Moongate’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings6

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low104
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `MoongateERC1155AirdropFactory` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and creates new instances of the `MoongateERC1155Airdrop` smart contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC1155AirdropFactory-MoongateERC1155AirdropFactory-ADMIN_ROLE.svg) ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721AirdropFactory` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and creates new instances of the `MoongateERC721AirdropFactory` smart contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC721AirdropFactory-MoongateERC721AirdropFactory-ADMIN_ROLE.svg) ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdropFactory` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and creates new instances of the `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdropFactory` smart contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdropFactory-MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdropFactory-ADMIN_ROLE.svg) ----- In the contract `MoongateERC1155Airdrop` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and performs the following actions. - mint new tokens - change the default and token royalty - change the URI - pause and unpause the smart contract ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC1155Airdrop-MoongateERC1155Airdrop-ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `MoongateERC1155Airdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grants Admin role. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC1155Airdrop-MoongateERC1155Airdrop-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721Airdrop` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and performs the following actions. - mint new tokens - change the base and token URI - change the default and token royalty - pause and unpause the smart contract ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC721Airdrop-MoongateERC721Airdrop-ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `MoongateERC721Airdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grants Admin role. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC721Airdrop-MoongateERC721Airdrop-_owner.svg) ----- In the contract `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop` the role `ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and performs the following actions. - mint new tokens - change the base and token URI - change the default and token royalty - pause and unpause the smart contract ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop-MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop-ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grants Admin role. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-5d7f-00b5ac80-a5b8-67c25132a1aa/diagrams/centralization_MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop-MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop-_owner.svg)

LowCheck-Effect-Interaction pattern not usedOpen

In the `airdrop` and `airdropAutoId` functions, the code invokes `_safeMint(to, tokenId)`, before setting the token URI through `_setTokenURI(tokenId, uri)`. The order of these operations does not follow the recommended `Check-Effect-Interaction pattern`. When `_safeMint` is called, the receiver contract's `onERC721Received` callback could trigger a reentry into the original functions before the `_setTokenURI` is executed. While the issue is present in the code, its current context does not introduce any security impact.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (6)

  • contracts/templates/MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdrop.sol
  • contracts/templates/MoongateERC1155Airdrop.sol
  • contracts/templates/MoongateERC721Airdrop.sol
  • contracts/factories/MoongateERC1155AirdropFactory.sol
  • contracts/factories/MoongateERC721SoulboundAirdropFactory.sol
  • contracts/factories/MoongateERC721AirdropFactory.sol

Part of Moongate’s security record

Moongate
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Nov 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn that report, 5 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
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CertiK

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